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E-PROXIES FOR SALE? CORPORATE VOTE-BUYING IN
THE INTERNET AGE
Douglas R. Cole*
Abstract: Advances in electronic communications technology promise to invigorate
shareholder voting as a viable tool for corporate governance, for example by decreasing the
cost, and thereby increasing the frequency and effectiveness, of proxy fights. Increased use of
shareholder voting, though, forces renewed focus on issues related to the shareholder voting
process. One such issue is vote-buying. Traditionally, courts have treated vote-buying in the
corporate context as per se illegal. More recently, however, courts have relaxed their attitude
toward such transactions, a move generally applauded by commentators. This article argues
that the newfound judicial acceptance of vote-buying is problematic, at least for publicly-held
corporations. The article examines the reasons offered in support of vote-buying in such
corporations, and suggests that the same benefits could be obtained, without the threat of
harm presented by vote-buying, through the use of turnout payments to encourage shareholder
participation in corporate voting contests. With regard to closely-held corporations, however,
the article argues that vote-buying serves a useful preference aggregation function and
generally should be permitted
"Vote-buying" evokes images of illicit deals by campaign workers
attempting to fix political races on behalf of their candidates.' Vote-
buying, however, is not limited to the political arena; it has implications
for corporate governance as well. Recently, questions regarding the
appropriate treatment of vote-buying, particularly vote-buying in the
context of political elections, have sparked renewed interest among
commentators.2 While focusing their efforts largely on civic voting, these
Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University. The author wishes to thank Sarah Cole, Jody
Kraus, D. Gordon Smith, Arthur Greenbaum, Ruth Colker, and James Brudney for their insightful
comments and suggestions. Any errors, of course, remain the author's alone.
1. For instance, in the late 1800s, William Tweed and his Tammany Hall cronies made extensive
use of vote-buying (among other things) to control New York politics. See ALEXANDER B. CALLOW,
JR., THE TWEED RING 208-09 (1966) ("On the eve of election, the boss and his ward leaders
collected an army of the party faithful, the unemployed, the underworld, the flotsam and jetsam of
the slums-the bums, frowsy, bleary-eyed, and ragged-and entertained them royally at the saloons,
where votes were openly bought and sold."). More recently, vote-buying allegations arose in the
2000 presidential election. See Richard S. Dunham, Sleight of Hand at the Polls: Florida Isn't an
Exception, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 27,2000, at 50, available at 2000 WL24486679 (reporting that in
Wisconsin a campaign worker "was caught on tape trying to influence voters by offering homeless
people cigarettes if they would cast absentee ballots"); cf. Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL.
L REV. 1323, 1327-28 (2000) (giving brief historical overview of vote-buying in political contests
and tracing it as far back as Greece and Rome).
2. See generally Hasen, supra note 1 (analyzing the potential bases supporting a ban on vote-
buying in civic elections); Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L REV. 111 (2000)
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scholars express support for the proposition that vote-buying in the
corporate governance realm largely is, and should be, permissible.3 In
doing so, they draw on recent case law and earlier commentary
suggesting that a judicial tolerance toward corporate vote-buying is
consistent with shareholder wealth-maximization principles.'
This Article argues that a permissive attitude toward vote-buying
arrangements in the corporate governance realm is inappropriate, and
that both courts and commentators have failed to recognize or appreciate
the harm to shareholders such arrangements could entail. This failure
takes on special significance in light of the potential for an increase in
such transactions provided by the reduced communication costs resulting
from increased Internet connectivity. This Article focuses on corporate
vote-buying in the Internet age, identifying both the possibilities and the
risks that such technology provides for enhancing shareholder
participation in corporate governance.
Whether vote-buying matters turns, at least in part, on whether
shareholder voting matters. The role and importance of shareholder
voting in corporate governance has long been the subject of debate
among courts and commentators.5 Theoretically, the power of the vote
(discussing the use of voting as a technique for aggregating preferences and considering the role
vote-buying might play in such preference aggregation).
3. The support these commentators offer for vote-buying is by no means unqualified. Saul
Levmore, for instance, states that "[a]lthough there is not much law on the subject, I will go along
with the current wisdom that vote-buying in corporate law is now more acceptable than it once was
and that we are soon likely to see more explicit legislative and judicial approval of trading in
shareholder voting rights." Levmore, supra note 2, at 138.
4. See Thomas J. Andrd, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry Into The Utility of Vote Buying in The Market
For Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 533, 565-72 (1990); Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying
and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 776, 806-07 (1979). But see FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 74-75
(1991) [hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE] (arguing that vote-buying serves no legitimate purpose
and should be banned).
5. For an excellent discussion of changes in judicial and academic attitudes toward shareholder
voting over time, see Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder
Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. REV. 485 (1994). Many commentators have concluded that the
shareholder vote, at least in a corporation with widely dispersed share ownership, is virtually
worthless due to the collective action problems the shareholders face in coordinating their votes. See,
e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 310 (1999) ("In both theory and practice.., shareholders' voting rights-at least in
publicly-traded corporations-are so weak as to be virtually meaningless."); John C. Coates IV,
Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are US. Public Corporations?,
24 J. CORP. L. 837, 849 (1999) (discussing collective action problems); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 402-03 (1983); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76
Vol. 76:793, 2001
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offered the ultimate corporate owner (i.e., the shareholder) a means to
retain control over corporate management. Recognition of the collective
action problems that plague the voting process, however, as well as the
availability of much stronger tools to discipline corporate managers, led
many commentators to conclude that the power to vote was almost
meaningless as a mechanism for corporate governance.6 Indeed, by the
mid-1980s, discussion of shareholder voting as a viable means of
removing entrenched corporate management was supplanted almost
CAL. L. REv. 1, 43 (1988) ("The reliability of shareholder voting as a decision mechanism for the
public corporation has come under sharp attack on the grounds that widely dispersed shareholders
face severe 'collective action' problems in dealing with managers who control the proxy
machinery."). Other commentators see more hope for shareholder voting power, at least in a world
populated by large institutional investors. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L REV. 520, 580-84 (1990) (discussing whether institutional investors may
be able to overcome the collective action problems that plague shareholder voting). While at least
some commentators have suggested that shareholder voting is essentially meaningless, Delaware
courts have long taken a different view, asserting that the power of the shareholder vote is the
legitimizing principle underpinning all of corporate law. See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc.
v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) ("Because of the overriding importance of voting
rights, this Court and the Court of Chancery have consistently acted to protect stockholders from
unwarranted interference with such rights.'); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No.
Civ.A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (referring to "the fundamental
importance of the voting rights of shareholders"); Hoschett v. TSI Int'l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43,
44 (Del. Ch. 1996) (referring to "[t]he critical importance of shareholder voting both to the theory
and to the reality of corporate governance"); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659
(Del. Ch. 1988) ("The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the
legitimacy of directorial power rests."). Indeed, Delaware at one point considered shareholder voting
rights so important that they were addressed in Delaware's Constitution. See DEL. CONST. art. 9, § 6
(amended 1903) (mandating that "[in all elections for directors or managers of stock corporations
each shareholder shall be entitled to one vote for each share of stock he may hold"). These
seemingly disparate views on the importance of shareholder voting are not necessarily contradictory;
the vote could be symbolically important while at the same time useless as a practical matter.
6. The recognition of the collective action problems presented by voting among a widely-
dispersed share ownership, with the concomitant agency cost problems, is widely attributed to Adolf
Berle and Gardiner Means in ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). For a discussion of the impact of these collective
action problems on the viability of shareholder voting as a control mechanism, see sources cited
supra note 5. See also Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance, 91 Colum.
L Rev. 10, 12-13 (1991) (discussing Berle-Means view of importance of shareholder voting); Zohar
Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting. Property Rule or Liability Rule?, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 741,
749-63 (1997); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem and
the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980) (discussing collective action problems
shareholders face in responding to a takeover bid). These collective action problems are discussed in
greater detail infra Section I.B.
Washington Law Review Vol. 76:793, 2001
entirely by reliance on the possibilities presented by corporate
acquisition through means of a tender offer.
7
Since the late 1980s, however, corporate managers seeking to insulate
themselves,8 often aided by state legislatures leery of seeing local
corporations acquired and the corporation's assets moved beyond the
reach of the legislature's taxing power,9 have erected sophisticated
takeover defenses designed to prevent acquisition. Thwarted by these
defenses, potential acquirers once again turned to the power of the
shareholder vote, attempting to wrest control of the corporation through
proxy contests or consent solicitations,"' but their initial attempts proved
both costly and largely unsuccessful."
7. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Corporate Law After the Eighties: Reflections on the Relationship
Between Management, Shareholders and Stakeholders, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 519, 533 (1992)
(stating that tender offers replaced proxy fights as principal means of hostile acquisition); Lyman
Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1862, 1864 (1989) ("Over
the past two decades, the hostile takeover has replaced the proxy fight as the more potent vehicle for
wresting corporate control from incumbent management."); Guhan Subramanian, A New Takeover
Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill, 23
DEL. J. CORP. L. 375, 383-97 (1998) (discussing history of shift from proxy fights to tender offers
as means of obtaining change in corporate control). Of course, the new owner (i.e., the successful
tender offer bidder) would accomplish the actual change in management through use of his or her
shareholder powers. The concentration of all of the shares in a single owner, however, would remove
the collective action problems that had protected the entrenched management prior to the transaction.
8. Not surprisingly, corporate managers do not express their goals so directly. Rather, they
typically speak of protecting the shareholders' "long-term interests." According to these managers,
the market is "undervaluing" the company, and the shareholders need only wait for the market to
retum to rationality for them to realize share gains far in excess of those offered by the corporate
"raiders." See, e.g., Bank of Scotland Launches Surprise $34 Billion Hostile Bid for NatWest, Dow
JONES BUSINESS NEWS, Sept. 24, 1999 (reporting that the NatWest Board requested shareholders to
reject a takeover bid at a 20% premium to market prices because it "undervalues" the company);
Allied Colloids Snubs Hercules'$1.8-Billion Bid, CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 3, 1997, at 11 (stating that
in response to bid at 23% premium to market price, Allied Colloids' board "advised shareholders to
reject the bid, saying that it undervalues the company").
9. In the words of one commentator:
What motivates states to enact antitakeover legislation? Wary of raiders' tendencies to liquidate
companies, close plants, and lay off workers, state legislators seek to protect home-based
businesses. More specifically, the impetus likely derives from two sources: the enacting state's
desire to protect nonshareholder constituencies, including managers who are unable or unwilling
to persuade shareholders of the value of internal defensive measures, and financial
protectionism, where states desire to retain and maximize tax-generating resources.
John H. Matheson, Corporate Governance at the Millennium: The Decline of the Poison Pill
Antitakeover Defense, 22 HAMLINE L. REv. 703, 714-15 (1999).
10. See J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Reform as a Single Norm? Evidence
Related to Cross-Sectional Variation in Corporate Governance, 17 J. CORP. L. 125, 131-32 (1991)
(discussing evidence regarding shift from hostile takeovers back to proxy solicitations as means to
acquire corporate control). Proxy solicitations and consent solicitations are two different but related
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The advent of new technology, in particular the communications
opportunities afforded by personal computers and the Internet, holds
renewed promise for the role of shareholder voting in corporate
governance. Electronic mail and Internet-based communications provide
dissident shareholders (or potential acquirers) a means of instant, wide-
spread, low cost disclosure of the information they wish to share with
fellow shareholders. This technology similarly offers the possibility to
drastically reduce the price associated with soliciting votes, whether
proxies or consents, from these shareholders. 2 While these technological
advances may herald the emergence of shareholder voting as a viable
means of acquiring and/or exercising corporate control, they also focus
renewed attention on the scope of permissible inducements one may
means of achieving action through shareholder voting. Proxy solicitation refers to the process of
obtaining a shareholder's right to vote on issues presented at the annual meeting. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1991 & Supp. 2000) (describing proxies). Consent solicitation, on the other
hand, involves obtaining written shareholder consent to some proposed action not in conjunction
with the annual meeting. See, e.g., id. tit. 8, § 228 (describing consents). For the regulations
regarding proxy and consent solicitations in public companies, see SEC Rules 14a-1 to 14a-15; 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-15 (2000). Each solicitation method has distinct advantages and
disadvantages. The machinery of the proxy solicitation process, as well as the timing of the annual
meeting, are largely in the control of corporate management. This often makes meaningful
participation by dissidents difficult. Consent solicitations, because they need not occur in
conjunction with an annual meeting, are more easily initiated and controlled by a dissident
shareholder. The difficulty here, however, is that action by written consent requires consent by a
majority of all outstanding shareholders, while action by proxy requires only a plurality of the votes
actually cast at the annual meeting (assuming a quorum is present). For a more complete discussion
of the distinction between proxy solicitation and consent solicitations and the advantages and
disadvantages of each, see generally Eric S. Robinson, Defensive Tactics in Consent Solicitations, 51
Bus. LAW. 677 (1996).
11. Proxy solicitation contests typically cost millions of dollars. See Kenneth J. Bialkin et al.,
Proxy Contests for Corporate Control, 474 PLlICorp. 9, 57 (1985); Alan R. Palmiter, The
Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REv. 879, 896
n.71 (1994); MARK A. SARGENT, PROXY CONTESTS HANDBOOK Intro. 2 (1993) (stating that a
"dissident shareholder can conduct a proxy contest for $1 to $15 million"); Alison Leigh Cowan,
The Trench Warriors, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1988, § 3 at I (describing proxy solicitation as costing
$1.7 million exclusive of legal and investment banking fees). The dissidents achieve complete
success in only about 30% of the contests. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Impact
of Rights Plans on Proxy Contests: Reevaluating Moran v. Household International, 14 INT'L REv.
L. & ECON. 327, 329-30 (1994) (reviewing 76 proxy contests conducted between 1986 and 1991).
Dissident groups, however, are at least partially successful in slightly over 50% of all cases. Id.
12. In 1998, for instance, ADP Investor Communications Services, a proxy solicitation firm,
charged its corporate clients $0.03 for processing proxies returned by Intemet, less than one-tenth
the $0.34 it charged for processing proxies returned by mail. HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE 11-16 (2d. ed. 1998); see also Catherine S. Powell, Electronic Proxy
Voting in Wisconsin Would Benefit Corporatioi, Shareholders, 72 WIS. LAW. 28 n.6 (Feb. 1999)
(reporting similar figures). If investors agree to receive their proxy materials electronically, as well
as to vote electronically, the savings are even greater. FRIEDMAN, supra, at 11-16.
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offer a shareholder in an attempt to secure her vote. In particular, should
it be permissible to buy shareholder votes?
This Article examines corporate voting in the Internet age and
discusses the appropriateness of vote-buying in light of the expanded
possibilities for active shareholder involvement in corporate governance.
Section I discusses the role shareholder voting plays within a
corporation. After providing a brief historical perspective, Section I
discusses the various collective action problems that undermine
shareholders' attempts to use voting as a means of corporate
management. It then discusses the potential impact communications
technology may have on those collective action problems.
Section II describes "vote-buying" and the role it has played in
corporate voting. After briefly reviewing the early judicial treatment of
vote-buying as per se illegal, it discusses the shift to a rule of reason
regime, first announced in the seminal case of Schreiber v. Carney.3
This modem approach requires a case-by-case analysis of vote-buying
transactions and attempts to separate "good" vote-buying from "bad."
Section II addresses whether the newfound judicial receptiveness
toward vote-buying (since Schreiber, courts have not struck down a
single instance of alleged vote-buying) 4 actually advances the goal of
shareholder wealth maximization. It considers whether vote-buying in a
publicly held corporation, in light of the reduced transaction costs
promised by electronic communication, might present a viable
mechanism for invigorating shareholder participation. It concludes,
however, that despite suggestions by commentators to the contrary, a
permissive attitude toward traditional vote-buying cannot be justified on
this basis. Indeed, closer analysis of previous cases suggests that even
apparently beneficial instances of traditional corporate vote-buying could
instead be seen as examples of coercive wealth transfers between various
classes of corporate stakeholders. This Section then distinguishes a
separate, but related, concept-the idea of paying shareholders to
participate in voting, independent of the voting option they select. It
suggests that this type of vote-buying-a "turnout incentive"-may hold
promise for empowering shareholder voting while avoiding the
difficulties traditional vote-buying presents.
Finally, Section IV examines whether a different judicial treatment of
vote-buying in the close corporation context may be appropriate. In
13. 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982).
14. For discussion of the post-Schreiber cases, see infra notes 150-87 and accompanying text.
Vol. 76:793, 2001
Corporate Vote-Buying
particular, it suggests that with regard to close corporations, the
shareholders' principal concerns often arise from difficulties in
coordination rather than collective action problems. This Section argues
that shareholders in close corporations are less likely to share uni-peaked
preferences 5 on corporate voting issues than the shareholders in large
public corporations, and suggests that close corporations could use vote-
buying as a means of aggregating preferences. Section IV concludes that
while other techniques could potentially achieve the same results, vote-
buying might represent an efficient mechanism for accomplishing such
preference aggregation, justifying a different treatment with regard to
close corporations.
This Article concludes that while the Internet and electronic
communication may reinvigorate shareholder voting as a useful tool for
corporate governance, courts and legislatures should be reluctant to
accept vote-buying as part of the new voting regime, at least with respect
to publicly-held corporations.
I. THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET
Perhaps the fundamental problem plaguing the corporate structure is
the divergence between ownership and control that occurs as a result of
shareholders (i.e., owners) entrusting control over their capital
contributions to a separate group, corporate managers, whose interests
may diverge from those of shareholders. 6 Shareholders confront the
15. "Uni-peaked preferences" refers to those situations in which the voters (here shareholders)
share identical preferences with regard to the voting alternatives presented. DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 48-49 (1991); see also Maxwell L. Steams, Standing
Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1378-81 (1995)
(providing an example of voting outcomes in the face of uni-peaked preferences). That is, the voters
would all rank the various potential outcomes in the same order. By contrast, "multi-peaked
preferences" refers to situations in which the members of the group have divergent preferences.
Steams, supra, at 1331-33. The magnitude of a given peak is a function both of the number of
people that share the preference, and the intensity with which they hold it.
16. Berle & Means are credited with first recognizing the importance of the divergence problem.
See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6. The notion that the divergence between ownership and control is
a central problem of corporate law is a staple of the law and economics literature. See, e.g., Bernard
Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911,
1913 (1996) (explaining that corporate law "should have the same principal goal in developed and
emerging economies-succinctly stated, to provide governance rules that maximize the value of
corporate enterprises to investors"); Matheson, supra note 9, at 709 (stating that "The great
challenge of corporate law in the modem era, then, is to minimize agency costs by constraining
abuse of managerial discretion"); Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the
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choice between investing time and effort in monitoring the corporate
managers, or suffering the deleterious effects (for example, excessive
salaries or shirking) that may result from such divergence. Much of
corporate law can be understood as an attempt to adopt rules that
minimize these agency costs.17 In this Section, the Article discusses the
agency costs shareholders face and examines the role voting plays in
minimizing those costs. In particular, it discusses the collective action
problems that affect voters in their attempt to coordinate voting efforts. It
then discusses the promise that modem electronic communications, in
particular the Internet, hold for enhancing shareholder coordination.
Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1197 (1999) (discussing how both the agency cost model
of corporate law and the contractual theory of the firm are grounded in concerns about divergence
between ownership and control); ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 9-11; Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169-74 (1981). This view, while widely accepted, is
controversial. Some commentators have suggested that the importance of this divergence as an
explanatory force of corporate law has been overstated. For example, in Blair & Stout, supra note 5,
the authors contend that this divergence theory of corporate law reflects a "shareholder primacy"
view (i.e., that the directors should focus solely on the wealth effects of their decisions on
shareholders) that fails to explain corporate law either normatively or positively. They suggest that
corporate management is better understood as a "mediative hierarchy" that balances competing
desires advanced by various corporate constituencies. Id. at 271-87; see also. e.g., William W.
Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 180,208-
15 (1992), and sources cited therein, discussing the corporate form in terms of its "mediative
effects." Other commentators have suggested that this "shareholder primacy" view should be
replaced by a paradigm in which the scope of the directors' focus extends to all corporate
"stakeholders" or even to society as a whole. See generally Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as
Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1409
(1993) (suggesting beneficial aspects of "multi-constituency" approach to corporate law, whereby
director duties are directed toward those affected by corporate acts); Morey W. McDaniel,
Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REv. 121 (1991) (arguing that directors should be
empowered to pursue dual goal of maximizing stockholder wealth and minimizing stakeholder loss);
David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991).
17. See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 9, at 709; ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 34-35. As
noted above, some commentators challenge the importance of these agency cost issues. See supra
note 16. Examples of tools designed to minimize agency costs are the duties of care and loyalty. The
prospect of ex post director liability for mismanagement or theft provides appropriate ex ante
incentives for directors to avoid shareholder harms. As with voting, however, the effectiveness of
judicial enforcement of these duties as a means to discipline corporate managers is open to question.
See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking
Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REv. 409, 465-66 (1998).
Corporate Vote-Buying
A. The Divergence of Ownership and Control
In most publicly held corporations, shareholders are not involved in
the day-to-day operations of the company; these operations are largely
left to management. 8 Management, however, may have interests that are
not perfectly aligned with those of the shareholders. The classic example
is the issue of management salaries. Managers, as a rule, would prefer
high salaries and little work; shareholders, of course, have diametrically
opposed preferences.19
This divergence in preferences between the corporate principal (i.e.,
the shareholders) and the agents raises the prospect of monitoring costs.
That is, shareholders are faced with the choice of either suffering the
costs the divergences impose or undertaking monitoring to ensure that
the management is faithfully carrying out its task of maximizing
shareholder wealth."0 Such monitoring is, of course, not free, and
shareholders seek to minimize the net costs associated with it.2 This can
involve, for instance, attempts to create self-enforcing mechanisms to
align management's financial incentives with those of the shareholders.
18. Members of "management" can include shareholders. Indeed, in many, if not most,
corporations, the corporate officers and directors receive at least part of their compensation in stock
or stock options. For instance, according to the KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL 22ND ANNUAL
BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 6 (1995), 62% of outside directors receive stock or stock options as
part of their compensation. See also Michael S. Knoll, An Accretion Corporate Income Tax, 49
STAN. L REV. 1, 21 (1996) (noting that corporate directors and officers are typically compensated in
stock or options); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governanace
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 919 n.113 (1996) (citing Kom/Ferry
study). In managing the day-to-day affairs of the corporation, however, the persons are acting as
"managers," not in their capacity as "shareholders.'
19. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation,
1989 Wis. L REv. 881, 889-91. This is not to suggest that shareholders as a group prefer that the
corporation pay low salaries. Low salaries might prevent the firm from attracting talented managers.
Rather, the shareholders would prefer that for a given level of productivity, the corporation pay as
little as is necessary. Managers, on the other hand, would prefer greater corporate largesse.
20. This again assumes a "shareholder primacy" view of corporate law. Commentators arguing
against this view have suggested that management's "goal" is actually much broader, and includes
balancing the interests of competing corporate "stakeholders" or even society as a whole. See supra
note 15. The proponents of these broader views of corporate responsibility, however, largely have
failed to explain why shareholders would choose to invest their capital in firms that undertake such
balancing acts (assuming the existence of other corporations that do not elect to treat shareholder
interests as one of many "balancing" factors).
21. More correctly, shareholders attempt to minimize the sum of the monitoring costs plus the
costs resulting from the agents' dilatory conduct. That is, the rational shareholder will incur an
additional dollar of monitoring cost only if it results in a savings of at least one dollar in losses
arising from agent misconduct
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Examples of this include performance-based compensation and stock
options.22
Shareholder voting is another weapon in the shareholders' arsenal for
use in this ongoing quest to minimize the costs resulting from the
divergence between management and shareholder interests. Through
their collective votes, shareholders can elect the board of directors who,
in turn, are responsible for managing the affairs of the corporation.23 If
the board is lax in performing its oversight role or, alternatively, has been
"captured" by management, shareholders can theoretically elect a new
board that presumably will exercise greater vigilance. That is, through
their collective will, shareholders can effect changes in corporate control
either by replacing directors and (indirectly) management24 in the event
of poor shareholder returns, or even by dissolving the corporation or
merging it with another.25
Courts and legislatures have viewed this right to control the
corporation through voting as one of the most fundamental aspects of
share ownership. Courts, for example, have characterized this right as the
shareholder's "supreme right and main protection, 2 6 or "a right so
essential to the enjoyment of property in stock that, it has been
suggested, it is a part of the property itself. ' 27 State legislatures and the
22. See generally D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence:
Lessons from Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1062-1109 (1996) (discussing various tools commonly
employed to align managers' and shareholders' incentives).
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991 & Supp. 2000) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors ....").
24. Shareholders do not have the right to hire or fire corporate officers and cannot force directors
to do so. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (affairs of corporation managed by the board);
Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 265 (Del. 1995) ("It is a fundamental
principle of Delaware General Corporation Law that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the
business and affairs of the corporation."); see also Peter V. Letsou, Shareholder Voice and the
Market for Corporate Control, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 759-63 (1992) (discussing limitations on
ability of shareholder to direct day-to-day activities of corporation). The full extent of shareholder
participation in day-to-day corporate management is the right to elect the board. Of course, the right
to elect (or remove) directors provides indirect control over director choices. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k).
25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 (merger), 271 (dissolution). The shareholders cannot
accomplish either a merger or dissolution directly. A merger, for instance, must begin with a
resolution by the board, id. tit. 8, § 251(b), which in turn is put to the shareholders for vote. The
shareholders can, however, elect directors supportive of a merger, and thus accomplish indirectly
what they cannot accomplish directly.
26. Stokes v. Cont'l Trust Co., 78 N.E. 1090, 1093 (N.Y. 1906).
27. In re Diamond State Brewery, 2 A.2d 254, 256-57 (Del. Ch. 1938); see also, e.g., Hoschett v.
TSI Int'l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 44 (Del. Ch. 1996) (referring to the "critical importance of
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drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act have taken a similar
view toward the importance of shareholder voting rights, mandating that
for every corporation, one or more classes of shares, taken together, must
have unlimited voting power in the company. 8
Of course, shareholder voting is not the only means, or even
necessarily a primary one, of actually performing management oversight.
For instance, reputational constraints often bind management's
discretion.' Even the CEO of a corporation must be concerned about her
next job. Laying waste to the corporate assets of the company she is
managing is hardly a strong recommendation for her next position.
The market for corporate control provides an even more important
monitoring function.30 The threat of hostile takeover with its resultant
shareholder voting both to the theory and to the reality of corporate governance"); Carmody v. Toll
Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1193 (Del. Ch. 1998) (shareholder vote is "ideological underpinning
upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests") (quoting Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564
A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
28. For example, New York's corporate code specifies that:
the certificate of incorporation may deny, limit or otherwise define the voting rights and may
limit or otherwise define the dividend or liquidation rights of shares of any class, but no such
denial, limitation or definition of voting rights shall be effective unless at the time one or more
classes of outstanding shares or bonds, singly or in the aggregate, are entitled to full voting
rights.
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAiv § 501 (McKinney 1986) (emphasis added). The Model Business Corporation
Act (MBCA) provides that the articles of incorporation must authorize "one or more classes of
shares that taken together have unlimited voting rights." MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 6.01(b)
(1998). Twenty-four states have adopted this statute. See id. at xxvii (listing states that have adopted
the act). For examples of state statutes, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0601 (West 2000); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-6-01(c) (1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 23b.06.010(2) (2000). While not adopting the
MBCA language, Delaware's corporate statute provides a similar result, at least implicitly. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b).
29. See Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U.
CHi. L REV. 567, 583-84 (1997) (discussing reputational constraints on managers with respect to
fraudulent disclosures); Smith, supra note 22, at 1079 (discussing limitations reputational concerns
impose on managerial behavior). For a discussion of some limitations of reputational constraints as a
means of minimizing agency costs, see Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing
Is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 694-702 (1999)
(discussing the breakdown of reputational constraints in corporate end-game scenarios).
30. According to Matheson, supra note 9, at 710:
In addition, market forces, like the market for corporate control, may also constrain managerial
abuses. At one extreme, this monitoring model views shareholders as owners of the corporation
and posits that stock ownership is like ownership of any other property. Unhappy shareholders
can simply sell their shares to others. At the least, such conduct should evidence their
displeasure with management. If sold to a bidder in a tender offer, such a sale might result in the
ouster of management. Throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s, this market in corporate
control acted as an important mechanism for monitoring corporate behavior.
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removal of entrenched management can provide strong incentives to
fully utilize corporate assets.31 Notwithstanding these alternative methods
for disciplining corporate management, however, an important question
to consider in discussing any aspect of corporate voting, including vote-
buying, is the extent to which it aids or injures the shareholders' attempt
to use their voting power as a means of monitoring management
performance.
B. Collective Action Problems and Their Impact on Shareholder
Voting as a Means To Minimize Agency Costs
While voting in theory empowers shareholders to monitor corporate
managers, in practice, collective action problems often prevent
shareholders from using the power of the vote to do so. These problems
arise from three related sources. First, if there are a significant number of
corporate shareholders, each may be rationally apathetic with respect to
the outcome of a particular vote. Second, any group activity that results
in a uniform benefit to the group independent of individual input of any
group member is subject to what is commonly called the free-rider
problem. Finally, even absent free-riding, large groups face significant
transaction costs in attempting to organize group behavior. Each of these
issues contributes to the problems shareholders face in attempting to use
their vote to maximize corporate returns.
1. Rational Apathy
As a general matter, that people choose to vote at all, whether in
corporate or civic elections, is somewhat of a mystery.32 A rational voter
would vote only if the benefits of voting (i.e., the increased likelihood of
the voter's preferred outcome winning the election) outweigh the costs
associated with casting the vote. The only vote that matters, however, is
the "swing vote," and even if there is only a relatively small number of
31. How successful these incentives are at disciplining corporate management is a topic of strong
debate. Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, have argued that the market forces are quite strong.
See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 96. Others have argued that the strength of these
incentives has been vastly overstated. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 19, at nn.33-37 (arguing that the
takeover market does not really act to constrain managerial discretion).
32. Commentators often refer to the "voter's paradox" or the "paradox of voting." For a detailed
discussion of the paradox of voting, and some potential explanations for why people vote in spite of




voters, the possibility that a given voter will cast this decisive ballot is
small. Although this is especially true with respect to civic elections
given the "one-person one-vote" rule, the same theory applies to large
publicly-held corporations with widely-dispersed share ownership.33
Moreover, even if the shareholder were convinced that his or her vote
would be the deciding vote, the shareholder may lack incentives to
participate in the voting process. In order to vote correctly on a given
proposition, a shareholder must first determine the probable returns
associated with each possible voting option. For example, assume the
shareholders are voting on a single issue with two outcomes-A or B.
Correctly choosing between them requires the shareholder to determine
the wealth effects of A versus B. Unfortunately, developing this
information is, or at least may be, very expensive for the shareholder. 4
For instance, assume that the company has put the question of whether
it should market an additional $100 million in bonds in order to build a
new production facility to shareholder vote.35 Each shareholder can either
vote yes or no. The "proper" vote, of course, will depend on the interest
rate of the bonds, the probable rate of return on the production facility,
the opportunity cost associated with dedicating management time and
energy into the development of new production facilities, and myriad
other factors.
An in-depth assessment of these factors would prove very expensive.
Any given shareholder choosing whether to make this expenditure must
acknowledge that he will get but a very small proportion of the return of
any increase in the net worth of the company. That is, assume that the
investment would be advisable and would increase the net worth of the
company by roughly $10 million. If there are 10 million shares, that
results in only a $1 per share increase. Shareholders holding few shares
could ill afford to invest significant amounts to determine whether they
should vote yes or no. In such situations, it may well be rational for the
shareholder to appear apathetic by choosing not to vote.36
33. There is one important difference between civic and corporate voting in this regard. Civic
voting typically does not have a "quorum"f requirement, while corporate voting does. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (1991 & Supp. 2000). Thus, if there are insufficient shareholder votes
present either in person or by proxy, shareholder action cannot occur. In general, this should increase
shareholder incentives to vote.
34. See Clark, supra note 4, at 779-82; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 402-03.
35. An example similar to the one posited here is offered in ECONOMIC STRUCrURE, supra note 4,
at 66-67.
36. See Clark, supra note 4, at 779-82; Peter J. Henning, Corporate Law After the Eighties:
Reflections on the Relationship Between Management, Shareholders and Stakeholders, 36 ST. LOUIS
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2. The Free-Rider Problem
Even shareholders owning large blocks of shares who would
otherwise have the proper incentives to invest in information may choose
not do so because of the free-rider problem.37 Assume, for instance, that
in the example above two shareholders each hold three percent blocks in
the company. Either of them could afford to invest roughly $90,000 in
researching the issue and still increase their wealth.3' Each of them,
however, would prefer that the other make the research expenditure. That
is, each would prefer to free-ride on the information produced by the
other. Because the shareholders benefit collectively (on a per share basis)
from the "proper" outcome on the vote, each individual shareholder has
the incentive to let another shareholder undertake the informational costs
associated with voting.
The free-rider problem is further exacerbated in the voting context
because information is a public good,39 and voting is an information-
intensive activity. One of the prime motivators of information
development in other markets-the ability to profit from private
U. L.J. 519, 533-34 (1992) (discussing rational apathy among shareholders). More correctly, the
shareholder acts apathetic. That is, the shareholder is not truly apathetic; she presumably prefers the
course that will yield the greater return on her investment. Because of the information costs,
however, she is unable (or unwilling) to distinguish which option better promotes her interest. Even
in such situations, voting may still benefit the shareholder. Voting may signal to management the
shareholder's willingness to become involved in corporate governance, thereby increasing the
incentives for the board to manage the company with the shareholder's interests in mind. For a
discussion of the strategic use of voting as a signaling mechanism, see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOCiAL NoRMs 122-25 (2000).
37. Clark, supra note 4, at 783-84.
38. Of course, this is not entirely correct. The return on this investment to one of the three percent
shareholders would indeed be S90,000, so either one could afford to spend S89,999 and still increase
their wealth. However, before performing the analysis, the shareholder does not know what the
profit will be; that is what he was attempting to determine. Thus, before the analysis, the shareholder
would not have a good idea what investment in information would be prudent. For instance, assume
that after investigation, the shareholder determines that the result of the vote would have no wealth
effects on the corporation. That is, the net value of the corporation would remain exactly the same
independent of which option was chosen. In that case, any expenditure by a shareholder would be
wealth decreasing for that shareholder.
39. That is, information is non-diminishable and non-rival. It has the potential to be shared with
another for no marginal cost other than the cost of distribution. For a thorough discussion of
information as a public good in the corporate governance context, see Kimberly D. Kraewic,
Fairness, Efficiency. and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information
Age, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 443, 458 60 (2001); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a
Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: "7Are We There Yet?," 20
CARDoZO L. Rav. 135, 198-201 (1998) (discussing firm-specific information as a public good).
Corporate Vote-Buying
information-is not present in the voting arena.4° In other areas, people
can often offset their information costs by an associated profit from
developing information that is not available to others in the market.
Patent, copyright, and trade secret law, for example, allow people who
develop valuable information to benefit privately from it.4 With voting,
on the other hand, private information does very little good. Imagine, for
instance, that a minority shareholder invests the necessary amount to
determine the "proper" voting choice. In order for that information to
benefit the shareholder at all, the shareholder must convince the
remaining shareholders, or at least a majority, to vote in the same manner
as he does.42 That is, the information that he developed does him
absolutely no good in the voting contest as private information; it is only
by the dissemination of the information that the shareholder can hope to
benefit at all.43 This results in a systematic underinvestment in voting
information.'
40. Note that this comment is strictly confined to voting. Shareholders may be able to profit from
private information about a company through other means, for example by purchasing shares (if the
information indicates that the market is undervaluing the company) or selling shares (if the
information shows that the market is overvaluing the company). Concerns that corporate insiders
might profit privately from information derived as a result of their positions in the corporation led to
the inclusion of a ban on insider trading in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). See
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
41. See, eg., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. Cin. L. REV. 1017, 1024-27 (1989) (explaining how the patent system
serves to overcome free-rider problems associated with information goods such as inventions).
Securing private benefits is not the justification for the patent or copyright statutes. Courts and
commentators generally agree that the principal purpose underlying these laws is securing public
benefit through increased investments in invention and the arts. See, e.g., Carol M. Silberberg,
Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 621 (2001)
('The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."
(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))). The means of
achieving this end, however, is through allocation of exclusive rights, thus resulting in private
benefits.
42. This is typically accomplished through a proxy or consent solicitation. See infra Section I.C.
43. Of course, this is not entirely true. Rather than try to influence the vote, the shareholder can
attempt to profit from the privately-developed information by buying or selling shares of the stock.
Assuming the shareholder has information that the other investors do not have indicating that the
value of the company will increase, the shareholder could conceivably enter into transactions with
the other shareholders to purchase their shares at advantageous prices. This immediately suggests an
interesting question. Why would a shareholder convinced that the value of the company would
increase with a correct voting outcome ever attempt to buy votes? It seems it would be much more
likely that the shareholder would elect to buy shares. By buying votes, the informed shareholder
must spread the gains derived from use of the privately-developed information with the other
shareholders. By buying their shares, the shareholder could keep the entirety of the gains. See infra
notes 211-17 and accompanying text. It may be that constraints imposed either by liquidity
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3. Voting and Coordination Problems
Coordination problems among shareholders further compound this
problem. Imagine, for instance, that in the example offered above a
"correct" decision on the voting issue would cost $10,000 to develop.
Imagine further that there are 1000 shareholders who each invest $1000
in information.45 If the shareholders each act independently, this would
result in a total research expenditure of $1 million, and yet still result in
each of the shareholders holding inadequate information to cast his or her
ballot appropriately. Clearly, the shareholders would benefit from some
type of coordinated research.
C. Proxy Solicitation and Collective Action Problems
One way in which shareholders could attempt to coordinate their
voting activities would be through use of some form of proxy solicitation
process. A simplified description of such a process would be one in
which a dissident group puts forward a proposal inconsistent with a
proposal offered by the board.46 This could be, for example, a different
slate of proposed directors, a bylaw amendment, or a response to a
merger bid from another firm.47 The board and the dissident group then
compete for proxies (or consents) from the remaining shareholders.
Providing for a proxy solicitation process addresses, at least in theory,
shareholder collective action problems in three ways. First, to the extent
that one or more of the shareholders develops information, it gives those
shareholders a method for distributing it to other shareholders. Even
though shareholders may be rationally apathetic given the prospect of
developing their own voting information, to the extent that they can
receive it free of charge from others, they would presumably be willing
limitations or a shareholder rights plan prevent acquisition of additional shares. In such cases,
sharing the information with the other shareholder voters is a second-best solution. See infra notes
249-62 and accompanying text. At least the shareholder will participate in the resulting gain to the
extent of his or her holdings.
44. See MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 28 (1971).
45. See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 66.
46. For a more detailed discussion of the proxy solicitation process and the overlapping web of
federal and state regulations that govern its conduct, see Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic:
Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1142-64 (1993).
47. In general, a proxy solicitation could occur in connection with any issue on which a
shareholder vote is required. Common examples of such acts include those listed in the text. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 §§ 141(d) (shareholder vote elects board); 242 (shareholder vote
required to amend charter), 251 (shareholder vote required to approve merger) (1991 & Supp. 2000).
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to act on it.4" Second, an individual shareholder (at least one who owns a
significant number of shares) may be more willing to invest in voting
information if she knows that there is a method in place for distributing
the information, thereby making it more likely that the information
would actually influence the outcome of the vote. Finally, a proxy
solicitation process ameliorates, at least to some degree, the shareholder
coordination problem. It encourages shareholders to share information in
a way that helps prevent multiple shareholders from making overlapping
investments in voting information.
While the possibilities of such contests are at least conceptually
beneficial to shareholders, in practice they are of questionable
effectiveness. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
implemented rules for proxy contests with respect to securities registered
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).49 Section
14(a) of the 1934 Act requires that any communications made with a
shareholder for the purpose of securing the shareholder's proxy must
comply with this set of rules.50 These rules specify, for example, the
information that must be sent,5 how that information must be
presented," and the filing requirements the soliciting party must meet
before sending the solicitation.53 While these rules may help in terms of
increasing shareholder comprehension of, and willingness to rely on, the
information provided, they also impose substantial costs on dissidents'
attempts to communicate with their fellow shareholders. 4
48. This is not a complete answer to the rational apathy problem. Note that even if the information
is provided, the voting decision is not "free." Shareholders must still invest sufficient time and
energy to review and analyze the material presented in the proxy solicitation, and may even find it
necessary to invest additional time and energy in verifying some or all of the information presented.
Moreover, in a proxy solicitation contest, the shareholder would presumably need to read two or
more competing proxy solicitations and attempt to determine which of the asserted positions best
serves his or her interest. At the very least, however, use of the proxy solicitation process should
lower the amount of investment in voting information, thereby presenting at least a partial response
to the rational apathy situation.
49. The Securities and Exchange Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ff (1994 & Supp. 1999).
The statutory text authorizing the SEC to regulate proxy solicitations appears at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
For the SEC rules implemented pursuant to that authority, see SEC Rules 14a-I to 14a-15; 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a (2000).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
51. 17 C.F.L §§ 240.14a-3 to 240.14a-4.
52. Id. § 240.14a-5.
53. Id. § 240.14a-6.
54. See Douglas G. Smith, A Comparative Analysis of the Proxy Mechanism in Germany, Japan
and the United States: Implications for the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 58 U.
PrrT. L REv. 145, 190 & n.240 (1996) ("Several commentators [have] argued that the [pre-1992]
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While the SEC continues to tinker with the proxy solicitation process
in an attempt to invigorate it,5 5 it is fair to say that, to date, it has not been
a panacea for the collective action problems shareholders face. To begin
with, the contests tend to be relatively expensive to the challenger, on the
order of several million dollars for a typical contest. 6 Thus, in
determining whether or not to develop voting information, the
shareholder must not only consider the cost of developing the
information, but also the cost of distributing it through the proxy process.
At the same time, dissidents engaging in proxy solicitation contests have
had only very limited success.5 7 One empirical study reviewed 76 proxy
solicitation contests and determined that the challengers achieved
complete success in only approximately 30% of cases, 58 hardly the kind
of success rate one would expect to induce major investment in such
activities.
proxy rules inhibited the ability of shareholders to monitor management and check managerial
excesses and inefficiency by placing a costly barrier in the way of communications among
shareholders.") (citing other sources); see also supra note I 1 (collecting sources regarding average
cost of proxy solicitation contest). It should be noted that the rules do also provide some benefits to
dissidents. For instance, SEC regulations provide that if a dissident's solicitation meets SEC
requirements, the corporation must either provide a list of the voting shareholders to whom the
information should be sent, or, at the soliciting party's expense, mail the information to the
shareholders itself. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7.
55. See, e.g., SEC Release Nos. 33-7760, 34-42055, IC-24107, 64 FR 61408, available at 1999
WL 1014713 (Nov. 10, 1999) (making revisions to proxy solicitation rules for stated purpose of
permitting "increased communications with security holders and the markets"); see also Bernard S.
Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 26 (1993) (discussing then-pending SEC
amendments to the proxy rules that subsequently have been enacted).
56. See Palmiter, supra note 11, at 896 n.71 (estimating expense of "about $5 million" for a
typical proxy contest); SARGENT, supra note 11, at Intro. 2 (1993) (stating that a "dissident
shareholder can conduct a proxy contest for $1 to $15 million"); Cowan, supra note 11, at I (S1 .7
million exclusive of legal and investment banking fees); see also Bialkin et al., supra note 11, at 56;
Mark A. Stach, An Overview of Legal and Tactical Considerations in Proxy Contests: The Primary
Means of Effecting Fundamental Corporate Change in the 1990s, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 745, 776
(1991) ("Proxy contests can be very expensive. For example, during a proxy fight for control of
Lockheed, the incumbents spent approximately $8 million and the insurgents spent approximately S6
million.").
57. See Andr6, supra note 4, at 578 n.184 (citing studies indicating that insurgents are successful
only 20-40% of the time).
58. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 11, at 329-32 (conducting a review of 76 proxy contests
conducted between 1986 and 1991). Thomas and Martin do note, however, that dissident groups are
at least partially successful in slightly over 50% of all cases. Id. For a complete analysis of dissident
success rates in proxy contests reported on an annual basis for the years 1957-77, and 1981-85, see
RONALD E. SCHRAGER, CORPORATE CONFLICTS: PROXY FIGHTS IN THE 1980S 8-11 (1986).
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D. The Impact of the Internet on Corporate Proxy Contests
As the foregoing discussion suggests, both shareholder voting
generally and proxy solicitation in particular are relatively expensive.
Participants in these activities face three principal types of costs:
information costs (the costs of detecting managerial shortcomings and
developing a competing position), disclosure costs (the regulatory
compliance costs and the communication costs to transmit the
information to other shareholders), and collection and tabulation costs
(the costs to process the proxies returned as a result of the solicitation
efforts). As such costs fall, however, proxy solicitation contests should
become a more viable mechanism for encouraging shareholder
participation.59
The development and implementation of Internet communications and
electronic mail offer great promise to reduce all three types of costs.6"
Unfortunately, until recently, attempts to adapt these technologies to the
proxy contest realm faced both significant technological and legal
hurdles. In 1990, less than 1% of American households had routine
access to electronic messaging or the Internet.6 From a regulatory
standpoint, perhaps the most significant impediment to the use of
electronic communications in proxy contests was the statutory
requirement under the corporate code of most states that a proxy be
"signed" by the shareholder granting it, with no explicit authorization of
electronic signature or transmission.62
59. See Andy Dworkin, Shareholder Knockout, THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 24,2000, at El:
Several experts also said the Internet is turning fights in shareholders' favor. People angry about
a company's performance can meet like-minded investors through stock chat rooms in Yahoo
and other websites. They can post proxy statements and other campaign materials electronically,
cutting down printing cost. "I think there's going to be more and more dissident activity around
the annual meeting as costs get lower and lower." [John) Wilcox [Vice-Chairman of the proxy
solicitation firm Georgeson Shareholder Communications, Inc.] said.
60. Friedman, for example, estimates that electronic distribution of proxy solicitation materials
would result in savings of approximately S2.50 to $5.50 per shareholder in printing and mailing
costs. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 11-16. On the tabulation side, ADP Investor Communication
Services, a firm that provides proxy distribution, collection, and tabulation services, charges $0.03 to
process an Internet proxy, less than one-tenth the $0.34 it charges to process those proxies returned
by mail. Id.
61. Thomas P. Vartanian, The Emerging Law of Cyberbanking: Dealing Effectively with the New
World of Electronic Banking and Bank Card Innovations, in DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET:
THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 452 PLI/Pat 141, 197 (1996) ("In 1990, when Internet access
first became more readily available to the public outside of government, research or academic
organizations, there were approximately 1 million users.").
62. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 11-13.
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Today, however, both the legal and the technological barriers have
been significantly reduced. Over 40% of the shareholding public now has
an e-mail address and daily Internet accessibility, up from approximately
26% only two years ago.63 Moreover, new subscribers are obtaining
Internet access every day, and estimates have predicted that by the
middle of 2001, over half of all individuals in the United States will have
Internet access. 64 Since 1985, thirty states have adopted statutes
permitting electronic proxies.65  The Delaware code, for example,
provides that:
Without limiting the manner in which a stockholder may authorize
another person or persons to act for such stockholder as proxy
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the following shall
constitute a valid means by which a stockholder may grant such
authority: ... A stockholder may authorize another person or
persons to act for such stockholder as proxy by transmitting or
authorizing the transmission of a telegram, cablegram, or other
means of electronic transmission to the person who will be the
holder of the proxy.., provided that any such telegram, cablegram
or other means of electronic transmission must either set forth or be
submitted with information from which it can be determined that
the telegram, cablegram or other electronic transmission was
authorized by the stockholder.6
With these legal and technological barriers largely removed, the
benefits of the Internet and electronic mail for proxy solicitation (and
63. For a thorough review of current Internet penetration, broken down by various demographics
including race and income, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN.,
FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION [hereinafter Digital Divide], available
at http://wwv.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttnOO/contentsOO.html (last visited July 31, 2001). See also
Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic Commerce: Why Self-
Regulation Is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REv. 847, 850 (1998) (stating that almost 20% of American
households have Internet accounts); Michelle J. Kane, Note, Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 483, 484 n.8 (1999) (finding that as of 1998 America Online had 12.5 million
subscribers). The 20% penetration in 1998 reflects a more than twofold increase over the previous
year. Haran Craig Rashes, The Impact of Telecommunication Competition and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 on Internet Service Providers, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 49,
59 (1997) (stating that in 1997 only 7% of households had Internet access).
64. See Digital Divide, supra note 63, at xv (Executive Summary).
65. See Jacqueline Dosick, State Law Amendments Make It Easier To Implement Electronic Proxy
Voting, 3 No. 7 Wallstreetlawyer.com: Sec. Elec. Age 19 n.1 (Dec. 1999), available at WESTLAW,
3 No. 7 GLWSLAW 19 (last visited July 31, 2001) (listing 30 states plus Puerto Rico that, as of the
date of publication, had statutes permitting electronic proxies).
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1991 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
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shareholder voting generally) should be imminently realizable.
Information costs should fall as corporate monitoring becomes both more
easily, and more timely, accomplished. Corporations will have the
opportunity, and potentially the obligation, to make more frequent
disclosures of material information. Especially in light of the information
technology used by most large corporations to track operational results,
corporate web pages could be required to reflect up to date results,
forecasts, and other firm-specific information. 7 Such regulations would
permit shareholders to detect corporate mismanagement more quickly
and easily, and thus sooner realize the need to mobilize the shareholder
vote.
Perhaps the greatest promise of the Internet is the potential for
reducing disclosure costs. Electronic mail offers world-wide,
instantaneous, nearly cost-free communications capabilities. While it
would be difficult for a given dissident shareholder to identify the
appropriate e-mail addresses of her fellow shareholders, proxy
solicitation firms can be expected to fill the void by maintaining
extensive databases containing that information.68  The required
information could then easily, quickly, and cheaply be distributed
directly to the shareholders for their consideration.69 Moreover, the use of
67. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 39, at 218-25 (discussing possibility of requiring continuous
disclosure of corporate operating results). One of the first commentators to consider the disclosure
possibilities offered by advances in electronic communications technology was Donald C.
Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV.
747 (1985). He more recently updated his proposal in Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective
Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 770-76 (1997)
(discussing version of continuous disclosure system). Of course, the extent to which corporations
will be, as opposed to "could be," required to provide continuous disclosure is largely dependent on
SEC and state law disclosure requirements. Technological feasibility, however, is undoubtedly an
important first step toward implementation of such requirements.
68. Proxy solicitation firms specialize in the distribution and collection of proxy solicitation
forms. They are "middlemen" in the proxy solicitation process. Perhaps the largest such firm is ADP
Investor Communication Services. See Cary I. Klafter, Using Web Sites for Investor Relations and
Stockholder Meeting Materials, SEA GLASS-CLE 435, 437 (1998) (same); D. Craig Nordlund,
Electronic Dissemination of Disclosure Documents, 1093 PLI/Corp. 39,42 (1999) (describing ADP
as the "key" proxy solicitation firm); Oesterle & Palmiter, supra note 5, at 510 (stating that over
70% of proxy solicitations are conducted by ADP). Both corporations and dissident shareholder
groups typically utilize such firms as part of their proxy solicitation efforts. Because of the
solicitation firms' specialization in communications, one would imagine that they would be among
the first to take advantage of the possibilities offered by the Internet.
69. Taking complete benefit of the communications possibilities presented by the Internet and
electronic mail would require amendments to the SEC regulations. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at
12-1 to 12-7 (discussing necessary changes). For instance, the regulations currently require that
proxy statements be mailed to security holders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (2000). In contrast to e-mail,
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web-pages may also allow for more complete disclosures of information
relating to the voting options. For example, SEC regulations currently
impose a 500-word limitation on descriptions of shareholder proposals
included within proxy solicitation statements.7 ° Shareholders making
proposals could include within this description the address of a website
containing more detailed information regarding their proposal.7"
These possibilities have not gone unnoticed. Indeed, according to one
commentator:
Dissidents and shareholder activists were among the first to
recognize the potential of the Internet. Bennett LeBow and the
Brooke Group took their proxy fight against RJR Nabisco into
cyberspace, posting all their proxy materials and fight letters on the
home page of their proxy solicitation firm, Georgeson & Company
Inc., and publishing the Web site address in all the printed materials
and advertisements.72
As technological and legal hurdles continue to disappear, one must
assume that such tactics will increasingly become a part of everyday
corporate life.
II. THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF VOTE-BUYING
The previous Section considered the corporate voting process, the
problems endemic to it, and the potential for the Internet to address at
least some of those concerns. If technological advances can serve to
reinvigorate shareholder voting as a tool for corporate governance,
however, it is important to revisit issues that may affect the voting
process. One such issue is the appropriate treatment of vote-buying. This
Section discusses vote-buying and the role it could play within the voting
"snail mail" (i.e., standard U.S. mail) is a particularly cumbersome device for communicating proxy
information. Typically, the information is first sent to the institution in whose "street name" the
stock is held, then forwarded to the brokerage, and finally on to the actual shareholder. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 12, at 11-14 to 11-16. Electronic distribution could automate this three-stage distribution
process leading to nearly instantaneous transmission to the ultimate voter. Id.
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2000) ("The proposal, including any accompanying supporting
statement, may not exceed 500 words.").
71. See Robert A. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud,
and Rule lOb-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 19 n.92 (1998) (discussing use of websites as means of avoiding
500 word limitation imposed by SEC); John C. Wilcox, Electronic Communication and Proxy
Voting: The Governance Implications of Shareholders in Cyberspace, 11 NO. 3 INSIGIiTS 8, 11
(Mar. 1997).
72. Wilcox, supra note 71, at 11.
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process. It begins by defining vote-buying and distinguishing it from
voting trusts and vote-pooling agreements-related, but distinct, methods
of coordinating voting power. It then briefly describes the judicial
treatment of vote-buying, including the historical antipathy to such
arrangements and the modem shift toward more relaxed judicial scrutiny.
A. Vote-Buying Defined
Delaware courts have used the term "vote-buying" to refer broadly to
any "voting agreement supported by consideration personal to the
stockholder, whereby the stockholder divorces his discretionary voting
power and votes as directed by the offeror."'73 In one case, a corporate
agreement to extend a loan to a large shareholder in return for the
shareholder's support of a merger constituted vote-buying.74 Similarly,
another court held that a guaranteed job with the corporation in exchange
for voting in a particular manner constituted vote-buying.75 In short, a
vote-buying agreement is one in which ownership (i.e., the right to claim
a residual interest in the assets of the corporation) is separated from the
shareholder's only means of control (i.e., the right to vote on how those
assets should be used) in exchange for consideration.
Of course, conceptually, vote-buying could take many forms. For
instance, votes could be bought on a one-time basis. The shareholder
would deliver a proxy giving the purchaser the right to vote on one issue,
such as a given election of the board of directors.76 Alternatively, vote-
buying could entail the permanent transfer of the right to vote the share.77
73. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 23 (Del. Ch. 1982); see also In re IXC Communications,
Inc. S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 17324, C.A. 17334, 1999 WL 1009174, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27,
1999) (citing Schreiber); Weinbergerv. Bankston, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,359 1987 WL20182, at *4
(Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 1987) (citing Schreiber); In re Sea-Land Corp. S'holders Litig., Civ. A. No.
8453, 1987 WL 11283, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1987) (citing Schreiber).
74. Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 23 ("It is clear that the loan constituted vote-buying as that term has
been defined by the courts.").
75. Hall v. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 146 A.2d 602, 613 (Del. Ch. 1958).
76. Indeed, SEC Rules provide that with regard to securities registered under the 1934 Act,
proxies are limited in duration to the next annual meeting following the proxy solicitation. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(2) (2000).
77. There are limitations on the ability to accomplish long-term vote sales through use of proxies.
Delaware law limits proxies to three years duration unless the proxy specifically states a longer
duration. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1991 & Supp. 2000). More importantly, if the share is
registered under the 1934 Act, SEC rules provide that no proxy solicited "shall confer authority...
[t]o vote at any annual meeting other than the next annual meeting ... to be held after the date on
which the proxy statement and form of proxy are first sent or given to security holders." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-4(d)(2). This limitation on proxies does not prevent the use of other techniques to effect a
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This would in effect create a derivative instrument, independent from the
underlying share and encompassing only the right to vote the share of
stock.78 Presumably a market could arise in which these voting rights
were traded just like any other sort of instrument.79 In fact, some have
suggested that there may be benefits to permitting just such a market.8"
Both forms of vote-buying present interesting, albeit somewhat different,
questions. Surprisingly, the law treats them the same. 8'
long-term sale of voting rights. See, e.g., infra note 78 (discussing dual-class recapitalizations); infra
Section II.B (describing voting trusts and voting agreements, both of which can be characterized in
appropriate circumstances as involving the long-term sale of voting rights).
78. Dual-class recapitalizations are a form of a permanent "sale" of votes. See generally Andrd,
supra note 4, at 620-23. In a dual-class recapitalization, a single class of stock is divided into two
classes, one with superior dividend rights, and one with superior voting rights. For example, the
"super-voting" class may have twenty votes per share, while the "super-dividend" class has only one
vote per share, but the right to receive two times the per-share dividend awarded to shares in the
super-voting class. In the dual-class recapitalization, each shareholder is given the right to trade each
of his existing shares for either a "super-voting" share or a "super-dividend" share. This presents
each shareholder with a classic example of the prisoner's dilemma. Each shareholder would prefer to
keep the voting power with non-management-aligned shareholders in order to permit effective
monitoring. Thus, each shareholder would prefer that a group of outsider shareholders maintain
voting control. However, because no single shareholder can be certain that his election of super-
voting stock will maintain outside control, the strictly dominant strategy for each shareholder is to
elect the "super-dividend" shares. Management shareholders, because they face greatly reduced
coordination problems, can elect the "super-voting" shares. Thus, through a dual-class
recapitalization, the management shareholders can effectively deprive the outside (i.e., non-
management) shareholders of their voting power permanently. Id. at 620. Because of the potential
for abuse, in 1987, the SEC promulgated Rule 19c-4 preventing dual-class recapitalizations. 17
C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1990). In Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
the D.C. Circuit struck down the rule as an unconstitutional exercise of the SEC's regulatory
authority. As a practical matter, however, Rule 19c-4 is still effective with regard to issues traded on
national exchanges. The New York Stock Exchange has made compliance with the text of the SEC
rule a listing requirement for all companies traded on that exchange. See NYSE Listed Company
Manual § 313, available at www.nyse.com/listed/listed.html (last visited July 31, 2001). The
American Exchange and NASDAQ have similar rules in effect. See American Stock Exchange
Listing Standard § 122, available at www.complianceintl.com/amex (last visited July 31, 2001);
Nasdaq Rule 4351, available at www.nasdr.com (last visited July 31, 2001).
79. See Douglas H. Blair et al., Unbundling Voting Rights and Profit Claims of Common Shares,
97 J. POL. ECON. 420, 421-22 (1989) (noting that Wall Street professionals were urging the creation
of such a market and theorizing that such a market would make the market for corporate control
more efficient).
80. Id.
81. Compare Schreiber v. Camey, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982) (providing for one-time vote-
buying), with Good v. Texaco, Inc., No. 7501, 1985 WL 11536 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985 ) (providing
for irrevocable proxy for one year).
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B. Other Voting Arrangements
Vote-buying agreements are not the only means whereby the
shareholder can separate ownership of the underlying share from the
power to vote that share. While vote-buying itself has always been
subject to governance by the common law,82 two other methods of
divorcing ownership and control-voting trusts and voting agreements-
are explicitly permitted by Delaware statute.83
In a voting trust, a group of shareholders transfers legal ownership of
their stock to a trustee for the purpose of vesting in him the right to vote
but retains beneficial ownership of the shares.84 Throughout the duration
of the trust, the trustee has the right to vote the stock, but he maintains a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders.85 Furthermore, the trust agreement
may specify the manner in which the trustee must vote the shares.86
Voting agreements, by contrast, do not involve the transfer of shares
to a trustee. The participants merely sign an agreement specifying that
each of them will vote their shares as provided in the agreement."' The
agreement can either specify the actual vote (i.e., the shareholders can
agree to vote for a specific candidate for the board), or it can simply
specify a procedure for determining how to vote.88 Because of concerns
about the separation of ownership and control, both voting trusts and
82. See discussion infra Sections I.C, I.D.
83. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1991 & Supp. 2000) (permitting voting trusts and
agreements).
84. Id. § 218(a). Until recently, such trusts were limited to a term of ten years, but 1994
amendments to the Delaware corporate code abolished this limitation.
85. See 5 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 2091.10 at 438 (1996) ("Voting trustees should be held to
adhere to the usual fiduciary principles of a trust."); JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 13.33,
at 13.84 (1995 & Supp. 2001) (noting that trustees' discretion to vote the shares is "subject to their
fiduciary duties"). For cases discussing the existence of this duty, see Regnery v. Meyers, 679
N.E.2d 74, 79 (I1. App. 1997) (holding that trustee has fiduciary duty to members of voting trust);
Siegel v. Ribak, 249 N.Y.S.2d 903, 906 (N.Y. 1964) (same). At least one court has held that the
parties to the trust can contractually narrow the scope of the fiduciary duty. Warehime v. Warehime,
761 A.2d 1138,1141 (Pa. 2000).
86. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 218(a).
87. Id. § 218(c).
88. Id. § 218(a).
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voting agreements were originally limited to ten-year terms.89 A 1994
amendment to the Delaware code, however, abolished this limitation.90
The main difference between voting trusts or voting agreements on the
one hand, and vote-buying on the other, is the nature of the consideration
employed. With regard to the former, the traditional form of
consideration is the reciprocal pledge of the other parties involved to
vote their shares in the prescribed manner.9' If cash or any other form of
consideration personal to the shareholder were offered to induce a party
to enter an otherwise legal voting agreement, the transaction would
constitute vote-buying and should be analyzed as such.92
Delaware courts have long considered voting trusts and voting
agreements to be in derogation of the common law prohibition on
interfering with voting rights, and thus have construed the statutory
provisions permitting them narrowly.93 Historically, strict compliance
with all of the statutory requirements for establishing a voting trust was a
necessary prerequisite to judicial enforcement.94 When the statutory
requirements were met, however, Delaware courts have ordered specific
89. See, e.g., Perry v. Mo.-Kan. Pipe Line Co., 191 A. 823 (Del. Ch. 1937) (striking down voting
trust for exceeding ten-year limitation). For a discussion of reasons why people should be wary of a
long-term separation of ownership and control, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 403-06,
410-11.
90. Brenda J. Houck, 1994 Statutory Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, 20
DEL. J. CORP. L. 477, 492-93 (1995).
91. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Bamrnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 443
(Del. 1947) (describing voting agreement where consideration on the part of each party was promise
to vote shares in specified manner); Pitman v. Lightfoot, 937 S.W.2d 496, 501-02 (Tex. App. 1996)
(discussing various shareholders who contributed stock to voting trust to create control group). The
principal purpose of voting trusts and agreements is to allow shareholders to exercise control over
the corporate entity by pooling their voting power and voting it as a block. Ben Fixman v.
Diversified Indus., Inc., I DEL. J. CORP. L. 171, 178-79 (Del. Ch. 1975).
92. See Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 23 (Del. Ch. 1982) ("Vote-buying, despite its negative
connotation, is simply a voting agreement supported by consideration personal to the
stockholder .... ). Including voting agreements supported by personal consideration within the
category of "vote-buying" responds to one of Hasen's criticisms of attempts to restrict vote-buying.
In his article, Hasen argues that it makes little sense to regulate vote-buying because parties could
easily evade limitations on it through use of voting trusts or voting agreements, and thus "a ban on
explicit vote-buying will simply increase the transaction costs of engaging in vote-buying by
requiring a more cumbersome method to reach the same result." Hasen, supra note 1, at 1352-53. If,
however, courts limit per se acceptance of voting trusts and voting agreements to those situations
where no personal consideration is present, Hasen's criticism seems misplaced. Parties could not
engage in vote-buying simply by structuring the transaction as a voting agreement or voting trust.
93. See Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338, 344 (Del. 1957); see also Oceanic Exploration Co.
v. Grynberg, 428 A.2d 1, 6-7 (Del. 1981) (discussing historical treatment of voting trusts).
94. See Abercrombie, 130 A.2d at 344.
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performance of the voting agreements." Furthermore, the recent trend
has been to relax the requirement of strict compliance. 6 Thus, it seems
clear that, at least in some instances, the unbundling of ownership and
voting control is allowed. As discussed below, however, the nature of the
consideration present in such arrangements-that is a reciprocal voting
pledge-prevents use of these techniques as a means to coercively
transfer shareholder wealth.9 7 Accordingly, whatever we may think about
these arrangements, they offer little guidance to the issue at hand.
C. The Historical Prohibition on Vote-Buying
While courts have grudgingly accepted the legislative mandate to
enforce certain types of voting arrangements, the common law approach
to vote-buying was a regime of per se illegality.98 Courts offered two
principal reasons for this approach. First, vote-buying was seen as a
corrupting influence on the fiduciary duty each shareholder in a
corporation was thought to owe his or her fellow shareholders.99 Second,
courts rejected vote-buying in the corporate context as analogous to vote-
buying in the democratic process." ° Just as vote-buying would corrupt
the democratic process, robbing the government of its legitimacy, so
would it affect corporate activities and decisions. This Section examines
these two arguments against vote-buying and concludes that while the
articulated reasoning is superficially appealing, upon closer examination,
neither basis provides much support for the historical judicial antipathy
toward vote-buying in the corporate context.
95. See F. O'NEiL, O'NEIL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.37 (1992) (collecting cases).
96. See Oceanic Exploration Co., 428 A.2d at 7; see also COX ET AL., supra note 85, § 13.33, at
13.85 ("The modem attitude is to uphold arrangements that do not comply with all the requirements
of the state voting-trust statute as long as the arrangement does not otherwise violate public
policy.").
97. See infra note 210.
98. See, eg., Smith v. S.F. & N.P. Ry, 47 P. 582, 590 (Cal. 1897) ("The stockholder cannot
separate the voting power from his stock by selling his right to vote for a consideration personal to
himself."); Chew v. Inverness Mgmt. Corp., 352 A.2d 426, 430 (Del. Ch. 1976); Macht v. Merchs.
Mortgage & Credit Co., 194 A. 19, 22 (Del. Ch. 1937); Brady v. Bean, 221 Ill. App. 279 (1921);
Morgenstem v. Cohon, 141 N.E.2d 314,317 (N.Y. 1957).
99. See infra Section II.C.1; see also Andre, supra note 4, at 543 n.27 (collecting cases).
100. See infra Section II.C.2; see also Andr6, supra note 4, at 542 n.26 (collecting cases).
Washington Law Review
1. Vote-Buying and Fiduciary Duty
The fiduciary duty concept arose from the notion that each corporate
shareholder owed every other shareholder the duty to vote using her own
independent judgment. The stated basis for this obligation was the belief
that "[t]he security of the small stockholders is found in the natural
disposition of each stockholder to promote the best interests of all, in
order to promote his individual interests."'' 1 Of course, this reasoning is
more accurately stated in reverse: the "natural disposition" of each
shareholder, assuming the shareholder acts rationally, is to promote his
or her own individual interest. In the absence of vote-buying, the
shareholder presumably could promote his or her individual interest only
by maximizing the value of his or her shares, thus achieving the
collective good of shareholder wealth maximization. In other words, an
outright prohibition on vote-buying can be understood as an attempt to
insure that shareholders' interests remain closely aligned. It would be
difficult, if not impossible, for one shareholder to benefit in his role as a
shareholder without every other shareholder capturing the same benefit.
This judicial hostility toward vote-buying was merely an early
example of the courts' recognition of the problems presented by a
divergence between ownership and control. A purchaser of corporate
votes, especially if it was a person without an ownership interest in the
company, could use his or her control to injure the corporate
shareholders.'0 2 Indeed, the only reason such a person would purchase
votes would presumably be if he or she could obtain a return on the
investment in vote-buying through exploitation of the corporate control.
It was through exposing the other shareholders to this risk that a vote-
selling shareholder violated his or her fiduciary duties.
101. Cone Ex'rs v. Russell, 21 A. 847, 849 (N.J. Ch. 1891), cited in Schreiber v. Carney, 447
A.2d 17,24 (Del. Ch. 1982).
102. See, e.g., Bostwick v. Chapman, 24 A. 32, 41 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1890):
It is the policy of our law that ownership of stock shall control the property and the management
of the corporation, and this cannot be accomplished, and this good policy is defeated, if
stockholders are permitted to surrender all their discretion and will in the important matter of
voting, and suffer themselves to be mere passive instruments in the hands of some agent, who
has no interest in the stock, equitable or legal, and no interest in the general prosperity of the
corporation.
See also Cone, 21 A. at 849 (noting that the transfer of voting rights "is the more dangerous because
the person intrusted with the power has no such inducement to promote the interests of the
corporation as the stock-owner has."); Andr6, supra note 4, at 542 n.25.
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Modem case law, however, rejects the notion that shareholders, at
least minority shareholders, owe their fellow shareholder any fiduciary
duty. 3 Minority shareholders now have well-recognized rights to
compete with the corporation in other business endeavors,es to withhold
corporate opportunities,"5 and even to engage in business transactions
that will result in financial detriment to the corporation's other
shareholders.' 6 In light of the courts' rejection of any fiduciary duty in
such contexts, it would be difficult to argue that there is some "fiduciary
duty" that would prevent a shareholder from selling his vote.'0 7
103. See, e.g., Priddy v. Edelman 883 F.2d 438, 445 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Minority shareholders owe
no fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders."); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d
1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) ("Under Delaware law a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a
majority interest or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation."); see also J. A. C.
Hetherington, Defining The Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22
WAKE FORpEST L REv. 9, 12 (1987) (citing HARRY G. HENm & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS § 240, at 653 (3d ed. 1983) ("Shareholders ... have traditionally been said to owe
no fiduciary obligations to each other."); Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dom, Institutional
Investors in the United States and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner's Perspective, 1992
COLuM. Bus. L REv. 223, 249 (1992) ("Clearly, shareholders owe no fiduciary duty to each other
when exercising their voting rights'"). For a more thorough discussion of minority shareholder rights
in close corporations, see generally Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close
Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749 (2000). Majority or
controlling shareholders, by contrast, do have a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders. See, e.g.,
Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-14 (Del. 1994) (discussing nature
and extent of the fiduciary duty); G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 240-41 (Ind.
2001) (same).
104. See Dowell v. Bitner, 652 N.E.2d 1372, 1378 (111 1995).
105. See Advanced Communications Design, Inc. v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285, 293-94 (Minn.
2000) (holding that even in close corporation, minority shareholder owed no fiduciary duty that
would prevent him from soliciting corporate customers).
106. See generally Waters v. Double L, Inc., 769 P.2d 582, 583-84 (Idaho 1999) (stating that
shareholder can vote on transaction in manner favorable to him, even if adverse to other
shareholders); see also Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1113-14 (stating that fiduciary duty limited to controlling
shareholder); Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at -1344 (same); In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders
Litig., No. C.A. 9483, 1990 WL 13475 (Del.Ch. Feb. 12, 1990) (same).
107. While the rejection of "fiduciary duty" applies only to minority shareholders, it is doubtful
that a majority shareholder would sell his votes. The majority shareholder has control, and thus is not
subject to the collective action problems minority shareholders face in determining whether or not to
sell their vote. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text. Interestingly, an argument could be
made that the person purchasing the votes has become a "controlling shareholder," and thus owes a
fiduciary duty to the remaining shareholders. See Zim v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993)
(fiduciary duty as majority shareholder).
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2. Analogies to Vote-Buying in the Democratic Process
The idea that vote-buying was illegal per se also had roots in an
analogy to vote-buying in the political arena. The general purpose of the
vote in both the commercial and the political forums is roughly
analogous-to pick representative agents' °8 to manage an institution for
the benefit of the voters, or in some cases to decide a specific issue.0 9
Courts and legislatures had uniformly rejected vote-buying in the
political context as a perversion of the democratic process." The
argument that, by analogy, vote-buying should be illegal in the corporate
context had many supporters, both among courts and commentators. "'
More recently, commentators have begun to question whether this
analogy is accurate."' In a recent article, Richard Hasen discussed three
potential rationales for the universal ban on vote-buying in political
contests: equality, efficiency, and inalienability.' The equality rationale
recognizes that the poor are more likely to sell votes, and the wealthy are
more likely to buy them, leading to a greater concentration of political
power in the wealthy merely because of their wealth."4 The efficiency
108. In the case of corporations, shareholders elect the board of directors; in government, voters
elect the officials.
109. Shareholders will sometimes vote on specific issues such as mergers or recapitalizations. In
the democratic process the referendum performs a similar role.
110. All fifty states and the federal government have enacted statutes making it a crime to buy
votes in government elections. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 1324 n.1 (collecting statutes). For
examples of statutes banning vote-buying in political contests see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-1014
(1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 32 (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-11 (Michie
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.01 (Anderson 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.85.060
(West 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.11 (West 1996). More recently, commentators have begun to
inquire whether there may be some benefits to permitting at least some forms of vote-buying in
political contests. Saul Levmore, for instance, suggests vote-buying in such contests might be useful
as a preference aggregation tool. Levmore, supra note 2, at 142-58. Richard Hasen, on the other
hand, draws a distinction between what he refers to as "core vote-buying" (i.e., direct payment for
votes) and "non-core vote-buying" (i.e., incentives such as campaign promises), and, while he
generally condemns the use of the first in political contests, he is more ambivalent about the latter.
Hasen, supra note 1, at 1370-71.
111. See, e.g., Andr6, supra note 4, at 542 n.26 (collecting a list of cases); see also Peter N.
Flocos, Toward a Liability Rule Approach to the "One Share, One Vote" Controversy: An Epitaph
for the SEC's Rule 19c-4?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1761, 1785-87 & nn. 109-24 (1990) (discussing early
academic support for the analogy).
112. See Clark, supra note 4, at 804-05; Daniel Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation
of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 119,141 (1987); Flocos,supra note I1, at 1784-
90; Hasen, supra note 1, at 1324-38.
113. Hasen, supra note 1, at 1324-26.
114. Id. at 1329-31.
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rationale suggests that vote-buyers might engage in rent-seeking
behavior"5  that diminishes net social wealth.' 6 The inalienability
rationale turns on "a moral judgment that votes should not be salable,"
which grows either out of the notion that voting is a group right
belonging to the community as a whole and, accordingly, is not alienable
by individual voters, or out of a broader anti-commodification norm that
suggests that selling votes would do violence to our conception of what
voting means." 7 Hasen argues that none of these three rationales requires
a ban on vote-buying in corporate contests. Equality is not an issue
because of the broad, shared understanding that corporate law is not
concerned with equality, but rather wealth maximization." 8 Inalienability
fails as a justification because there is simply no anti-commodification
principle applicable to corporate law." 9 Inefficiency, he suggests, fails to
support a ban because courts can provide sufficient policing to weed out
inefficient (i.e., non-wealth-maximizing) transfers. 2
While the efficiency point is potentially overstated,' Hasen certainly
seems correct that-as other commentators' and modem case law'12
have also recognized-there are significant differences between civic
and corporate voting. Voting in political contests is a public, not a private
right. 24 It attaches, not as a result of contract law, but rather as a
reflection of status. Furthermore, while a corporation's existence, and the
115. "Rent-seeking" has been defined as "the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., rates of
return on the use of an economic asset in excess of the market rate) through governmental
intervention in the market An example of rent-seeking is a firm's attempt to secure government-
granted monopolies." Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471,472 n.4 (1988).
116. Hasen, supra note 1, at 1331-35. In other words, the purchasers of the votes may use their
voting power to secure politicians who would act favorably to the vote-purchasers at the expense of
other constituents. For instance, a government contractor could use purchased votes to elect officials
who would execute above-market government contracts with the contractor, or a special interest
group could purchase votes to elect officials who would promote laws beneficial to that group.
117. Id. at 1335-38.
118. Hasen recognizes that his rejection of the equality argument turns on corporate law
incorporating a strong shareholder wealth maximization norm. Id. at 1353. If that norm is rejected,
as some commentators suggest it should be, see supra note 16, the equality argument may have
greater applicability to vote-buying.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1351-52.
121. See infra notes 221-74 and accompanying text.
122. See Clark, supra note 4, at 804-05; Fischel, supra note 112, at 141; Flocos, supra note 111,
at 1784-90.
123. See, e.g., Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 1986 WL 13008 at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986).
124. See Clark, supra note 4, at 804; Flocos supra note 111, at 1785-93 & nn.109-49.
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role of the shareholder's vote therein, is predicated in large part on
concepts of wealth maximization, government often concerns itself with
allocative and redistributive issues.
Perhaps the single most important difference between the corporate
and political voting regimes is the availability of a viable "exit" option.
That is, share ownership is an entirely voluntary undertaking. If a
shareholder disagrees with the course of action a corporation selects, the
shareholder can terminate his or her ownership interest by selling the
shares.'25 Citizens, by contrast, do not have the same range of options
open to them. Renouncing citizenship and acquiring citizenship in
another country certainly entails more substantial costs than selling
corporate shares on the market. The absence of a viable exit option
makes strong protection of the "voice" option'26 far more important in
the political arena. 27 Thus, whatever we conclude regarding vote-buying
in the political sphere, it does little to inform our choice regarding vote-
buying in the corporate world.
D. The Modern Treatment of Vote-Buying
The modern treatment of vote-buying in corporate law reflects an
outright rejection of the earlier notions of per se illegality. The shift in
the judicial attitudes toward vote-buying was announced in 1982 in
Schreiber v. Carney.128 In Schreiber, a shareholder brought a derivative
action on behalf of Texas International Airlines, challenging a loan made
by Texas International to Jet Capital, a 35% shareholder in Texas
International.129 The loan grew out of a restructuring involving a merger
between Texas International and Texas Air Corporation. 3 ° Under the
corporate charter, the merger required a majority vote from each of a
number of different classes of stock. 3' Because Jet Capital owned a
majority of the shares in one of the voting classes, it could maintain a
125. Note that the availability of "exit" is not a complete answer to shareholder concerns about
manipulation of the voting process. To the extent that damage has been inflicted on a corporation as
a result of the manipulation, the price a share will command is likely less than it would have been
absent the wrongful conduct.
126. The voice option refers to the right to vote or, in other words, to make one's voice heard.
127. See Flocos, supra note 111, at 1788-90 &nn.125-37.
128. 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982).
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 19.
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blocking position on the merger, even though the other shareholders
overwhelmingly supported the merger.11
Jet Capital agreed that the merger was in the best interests of Texas
International, but refused to support it, allegedly because of adverse
income tax effects resulting from its ownership of a number of
warrants. 3 Although it could escape these negative tax consequences by
exercising the warrants, it stated that it lacked sufficient cash to do so.
Thus, it felt constrained to vote against the merger. 34 In order to
overcome this impasse, the board of Texas International agreed that
Texas International should provide a loan to Jet Capital to fund its early
exercise of the warrants.' 35 The loan was put to shareholder vote and
overwhelmingly approved. 36
At least one shareholder, Leonard Schreiber, however, did not approve
of the transaction. He filed suit asserting that the transaction constituted
vote-buying and, under well-established law, was illegal per se.137 The
court agreed with Schreiber that the loan constituted vote-buying.13
According to the court, however, vote-buying was not per se illegal, but
rather must be examined on a case by case basis.1 39 Here, the vote-buying
passed judicial scrutiny.40
In order to reach this result, the court was forced to distinguish
precedents that at least superficially appeared to hold vote-buying illegal
per se. 4 ' In doing so, the court reexamined the old cases, and found two




135. Id. at 20.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 23. It is not entirely clear why this transaction involved vote-buying. After all, the
corporation loaned the money to the shareholder, it didn't merely give it away. It appears, however,
that the terms of the loan were more favorable than the shareholder could have gotten elsewhere.
According to the court, "borrowing money at the prevailing interest rates ... was deemed too
expensive by the management of Jet Capital." Id. at 19. Presumably the 5% rate offered by Texas
Air for the loan, id., was lower than market. A sub-market interest rate loan would constitute
consideration.
139. Id. at 25.
140. Id.
141. See generally Chew v. Inverness Mgmt. Corp., 352 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1976); Hall v. Isaacs
& Sons Farns, Inc., 146 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1958), aff'd 163 A.2d 288 (Del. 1960); Macht v.
Merchs. Mortgage & Credit Co., 194 A. 19 (Del. Ch. 1937).
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acted "to defraud" or "disenfranchise" stockholders."' 42 The Schreiber
court characterized Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 4 3 for
instance, one of the principal cases prohibiting vote-buying, as involving
"a series of criminally manipulative transactions instigated by a
designing director in order to wrest control of the corporation from the
other stockholders for fraudulent motives."' 44 According to the Schreiber
court, this proposition retained its vitality, but simply was not implicated
by the facts presented. 4 The second proposition was that vote-buying
was illegal per se because it violated public policy. The court, citing
evolving ideas of "public policy" and changed attitudes toward the
function of shareholders in corporate governance, explicitly rejected this
as a basis for invalidating vote-buying agreements. 146
The court was quick to point out, however, that its rejection of per se
invalidity for vote-buying agreements should not be taken as a sign that
courts would openly embrace these agreements. 147 The court noted that
vote-buying agreements had a potential for abuse. Thus, although vote-
buying agreements would no longer be void, they would still be voidable
and subject to a test of intrinsic fairness. 148 The agreement in question
here clearly passed this test, according to the court, as the disinterested
shareholders had overwhelmingly approved it following full
disclosure. "
To summarize, the state of the law after Schreiber required Delaware
courts to undertake a three-part test. First, determine if the agreement in
question constitutes vote-buying. That is, does it involve the transfer of
voting power in exchange for consideration personal to the shareholder?
If it does, then determine whether it acts to defraud or disenfranchise the
other shareholders. Finally, even if there is no fraud or
disenfranchisement, treat the agreement as a voidable transaction subject
to the test of intrinsic fairness. 50
142. Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 23.
143. 194 A. 19 (Del. Ch. 1937). The Schreiber court described Macht as the leading case for the
proposition that vote-buying was illegal per se. Schreiber, 747 A.2d at 23.
144. Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 23 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 26.







Delaware courts have addressed allegations of vote-buying a number
of times since the decision in Schreiber. In each of these cases, the court
has whole-heartedly embraced the Schreiber court's rejection of per se
illegality. In fact, as described below, some of these decisions go even
farther than Schreiber. Yet, in none of these cases was the voting
agreement struck down as illegal.
On two of these occasions, the court determined that the agreement in
question did not constitute vote-buying. In doing so, the courts narrowed
the expansive definition of vote-buying adopted by Schreiber. In Henley
Group, Inc. v. Sante Fe Southern Pacific Corp.,"' for instance, the court
held that Schreiber required as an "essential element of a vote buying
agreement... that '... . the stockholder divorces his discretionary voting
power and votes as directed by the offeror."" 52 According to the Henley
court, the fact that the party in the present case was not legally obligated
to vote in a certain way precluded any finding that vote-buying had
occurred.'53 Thus, under Henley, a threshold requirement for vote-buying
is a legally binding obligation to vote in a certain manner.
In the other case, Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Yonge,154 the court
instead focused on the issue of consideration. In that case, Van Reesema,
one of three shareholders in a closely held corporation, switched
loyalties. 55 As a result, the directors of the company were removed from
office and the corporate bylaws were amended.'56 The displaced directors
brought suit, alleging that the vote that removed them was illegal because
Van Reesema's vote had been bought. 7 According to the directors, Van
Reesema switched only after being offered a "consulting agreement" and
the release of certain legal claims against him.5 According to the judge,
however, this arrangement did not constitute vote-buying for two
reasons. First, Van Reesema's expectation of a consulting agreement was
not legally enforceable at the time of the vote.'59 Secondly, the
151. No. CIV. A. No. 9569, 1988 WL 23945 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 1988).
152. Id. at *7 (quoting Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 23).
153. Id.
154. No. CIV. A. No. 9432, 1989 WL 40805 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1989).
155. Id. at *1.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *2.
158. Id. at *5.
159. Id. at *7.
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consideration was not "a principal motivating force" in Van Reesema's
decision to vote the way that he did.
16 1
Taken together, these two cases narrow the broad definition of vote-
buying Schreiber offered. To constitute vote-buying, three things now
must occur. First, the "seller" must have a legally enforceable right to the
consideration offered. Second, that consideration must have been a
"principal motivating force" in the shareholder's vote. Finally, the seller
must have a legal obligation to vote in a certain manner. Absent these
three elements, a vote-buying charge will not stand.
Two other cases have addressed the second prong of the Schreiber
test, whether the alleged vote-buying acted to "defraud or
disenfranchise" the other shareholders. First, in Kass v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc.,61 Schreiber was extended to a case involving bondholder
consents. Eastern was attempting a merger with Texas Air. As part of the
deal, Eastern desired to pay a $1.75 dividend to its shareholders. 62
Payment of such a dividend, however, would violate certain covenants
contained in various outstanding convertible debentures. 6 These
covenants could be altered only with the consent of two-thirds of the
holders of these instruments.'6 In an attempt to secure these consents,
the board of Eastern offered to pay each debenture holder who consented
either $35 in cash or $125 in free Eastern ticket vouchers for each $1000
in face amount of debentures for which consent was given.
61
Not surprisingly, debenture holders who were opposed to relaxing the
covenants challenged this as illegal vote-buying. 66 In analyzing this
claim, the court, much like the Schreiber court, quickly rejected the
argument that analogized corporate vote-buying to vote-buying in
political contests.167 According to the court, the political system involved
important non-commercial considerations, and thus a trade of votes for
money would be corrupting.168 Commercial transactions, on the other
hand, involved solely commercial values, and thus, "commerce in votes"
160. Id. at *10.
161. 1986 WL 13008 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986).









was much more acceptable. 169 The court went so far as to say that in the
commercial setting, "to conclude that the offering of money in exchange
for consent (vote) is necessarily corrupt or a per se violation of public
policy strikes [the Court] as quaint."'170
The court thus rejected per se illegality and chose to adopt the
Schreiber analysis. Because the consideration was openly offered to each
of the bondholders on the same terms, the court concluded that it was not
fraudulent and could not act to disenfranchise any of the voters.' 71
Interestingly, it never addressed the third prong of the Schreiber test. It
did not treat the offer as a voidable transaction subject to approval by the
disinterested voters.
Most recently, a Delaware court addressed this issue in In re IXC
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.73  There, IXC, a
telecommunications company, placed itself "in play" by hiring an
investment bank to develop merger options. 74 Ultimately, Cincinnati
Bell, Inc. (CB1) forwarded a proposal to merge the two companies by
having the IXC shareholders exchange their shares for shares in CBI. 75
During the course of negotiations that led to the merger proposal, CBI
met with General Electric Pension Trust (GEPT), IXC's largest
shareholder with nearly a 40% stake.'76 CBI and GEPT reached a "side-
deal" regarding the proposed merger. 77 Pursuant to that deal, CBI
purchased half of GEPT's IXC holdings for $50 per share.'78 In
exchange, GEPT agreed to vote its remaining shares in favor of the
merger.1
79
After CBI presented its merger proposal to the board and the board
approved, dissident shareholders attempted to enjoin the shareholder vote
169. Id. at *3.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *4. This conclusion overlooks the coercive aspects of group action in light of a
prisoner's dilemma situation. See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
172. Of course, when the offer is open to all, it would be difficult to find disinterested voters.
However, Schreiber then requires the court to perform a judicial inquiry into the intrinsic fairness of
the transaction, an inquiry the court in Kass failed to undertake.
173. No. C.A. 17324, C.A. 17334, 1999 WL 1009174 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
174. Id. at *1.
175. Id. at *2.
176. Id.




necessary to complete the merger.18 The shareholders argued, inter alia,
that the CBI-GEPT deal constituted impermissible vote-buying. 8 ' In
addressing this charge, the court concluded that the arrangement could
well be considered vote-buying.8 2 Under Schreiber, however, the court
continued, such arrangements were void only if they acted to defraud or
disenfranchise the remaining shareholders.'83 Here, according to the
court, the plaintiffs admitted there was no fraud, so the only question was
disenfranchisement.'84 With regard to that issue, the court concluded that,
because GEPT held only a 40% interest (prior to its sale of 50% of its
shares to CBI), the agreement could not act to disenfranchise the
remaining independent shareholders.' 5 Finally, in response to the
plaintiffs' argument that the precommitment of the 40% interest in
support of the merger would "almost lock up" the vote, leaving the
remaining shareholders with "scant power" to oppose the deal, the court
said merely: 'Almost locked up' does not mean 'locked up,' and 'scant
power' may mean less power, but it decidedly does not mean 'no
power.""
'186
Under LYC, then, it appears that so long as less than 50% of the vote is
in the hands of the vote-purchaser prior to the election, the transaction is
not subject to challenge on disenfranchisement grounds. Moreover, as in
Kass, the court in IXC failed to address the third prong of Schreiber. That
is, it did not subject the vote-buying to approval by the disinterested
shareholders or a test of "intrinsic fairness." Whether this indicates that
intrinsic fairness is no longer part of the vote-buying analysis is
unclear.'87 What is clear, however, is that under modern case law, vote-
buying agreements receive far more generous treatment from the courts
than they have in the past.
180. Id. at *1.
181. Id. at *7-*9.
182. Id. at *3.
183. Id. at *8.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *9.
186. Id.
187. See generally Royce de R. Barondes, An Economic Analysis of the Potentialfor Coercion in
Consent Solicitations for Bonds, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 749 (1994) (suggesting based on game
theoretic model of bond solicitations that disclosure, rather than regulation, is sufficient to protect
bondholders from coercion, thus obviating need for fairness inquiry).
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I. VOTE-BUYING AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS
As discussed above, the historical prohibition on vote-buying was
premised on two separate arguments: a moral legitimacy argument that
condemned vote-buying as a matter of principle,"'8 and a shareholder
wealth effects argument that decried vote-buying based on its presumed
harm to other shareholders' economic interests.' 9 The modem treatment
of vote-buying rejects as inappropriate any consideration of the former,
and focuses exclusively on the latter. With regard to the wealth-effects
argument, it concludes that while shareholder wealth effects are the
appropriate standard against which to judge vote-buying, those
considerations do not support the earlier per se prohibition on vote-
buying. 9 Instead of rejecting vote-buying transactions wholesale, the
Schreiber court's three-prong approach attempts to segregate vote-
buying transactions on a case-by-case basis. The "defraud or
disenfranchise" prong, operating in conjunction with the requirement of
"intrinsic fairness" (to the extent that prong remains), appears to direct
courts to undertake this separation based on a determination of the
shareholder wealth effects resulting from the particular vote-buying
transaction at issue.' 9,
The shift to a paradigm in which the regulation of vote-buying centers
exclusively on a shareholder wealth maximization norm is not, in and of
itself, troublesome. Shareholder wealth effects are a core concern
throughout corporate law,' 92 and there is no immediately apparent reason
why those effects should not also be a core concern with regard to vote-
buying. Nevertheless, accepting shareholder wealth maximization
principles as an appropriate basis for regulating vote-buying does not
188. See supra Section I.C.2.
189. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Section II.D.
191. If this is indeed what the Schreiber rule intends courts to capture, certain post-Schreiber
interpretations of the test are questionable at best. For instance, IXC's focus on a "true majority"
standard to determine whether the vote-buying transaction "disenfranchised" the remaining
shareholders seems like a purely mechanistic test wholly-divorced from the underlying wealth
effects on the company shareholders. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
192. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency
Concerns, 49 EMORY LJ. 1085, 1094-95 (2000). While these authors argue that directors should
take account of broader constituencies, they acknowledge that "[t]he traditional view of corporate
law commands directors to make decisions that will maximize shareholder wealth." Id. at 1094. This
view of corporate law, referred to as the shareholder primacy view, is a central tenet of traditional
corporate law. See supra note 16 and sources cited therein.
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necessarily imply that the shift away from a per se rule to a case-by-case
approach furthers that goal.
To determine whether or not the shift is beneficial requires further
consideration of two things; first, the likely uses of vote-buying in a
permissive regime, and, second, the ability of courts to separate
beneficial and detrimental vote-buying transactions. If vote-buying
transactions are never beneficial to shareholders (or, if the potential costs
associated with such transactions as a whole far outweigh the benefits), it
may be that a per se rejection of such transactions better serves
shareholder interests. Even if there are potentially beneficial vote-buying
transactions, if courts are poorly equipped to separate them from
detrimental transactions, a per se rule may still have advantages,
notwithstanding the potential that certain pro-shareholder transactions
would be blocked.
This Section discusses various potential uses for vote-buying. It first
considers whether permitting vote-buying might allow shareholders to
use such transactions to overcome the collective action problems that
interfere with the their ability to use voting as an effective means of
corporate control, but concludes that this is unlikely. It then discusses the
possibility that vote-buying could be employed to facilitate corporate
looting or effect coercive wealth transfers between various investor
classes. It concludes that both of these represent very real threats, that the
potential for such abuses must figure prominently in determining the
appropriate regulatory approach, and that, to date, courts have proven
incapable of identifying instances in which these harms have occurred.
Finally, this Section discusses what some commentators have
advanced as the principal pro-shareholder justification for vote-buying,
the possibility that potential acquirers could employ such transactions to
overcome certain types of takeover defenses (in particular poison pills)
through which management has attempted to insulate itself from the
market for corporate control. While in these limited circumstances vote-
buying may indeed prove beneficial to shareholders as a group, this
Section discusses whether these same benefits could be achieved through
the related idea of turnout payments-that is, paying a shareholder to
vote, independent of the voting option the shareholder selects. It argues
that limiting permissible "vote-buying" to such turnout payments would
benefit shareholders by dismantling management's takeover protection,




A. Vote-Buying as a Response to the Collective Action Problems of
Shareholder Voting
As described above, four principal obstacles confront shareholders in
developing and using information in corporation governance. First, any
shareholder owning few shares will not capture a sufficient amount of
gain on any corporate vote to make any but the smallest investment in
information worthwhile. 93 Second, even large shareholders, who might
otherwise have sufficient economic incentives to pursue voting
information, may fall prey to the free-rider problem.'94 Third, in a voting
contest, there are no gains to be made from private information. 95
Fourth, coordination problems may prevent an efficient use of any
investments in voting information.
96
One possible shareholder response to these difficulties would be use
of a vote-pooling arrangement. This would be very similar to the voting
trust described earlier. Each shareholder would transfer his or her proxies
to a common pool. These proxies would then be voted as a block. In this
way, the information costs could be allocated to the members of the
pooling arrangement based on the amount of their investment. Because
all shareholders would be sharing the costs, there would be no free-rider
problem. Finally, there would be no duplicative research costs because
the individual shareholders would not be developing the information on
their own. The manager of the common pool would have a fiduciary duty
to vote the shares in such a manner as to maximize shareholder wealth.'97
Of course, an actual transfer of proxies to the common pool would not
be necessary. Each shareholder could simply be a member of an
information-pooling cooperative. The members would pay dues based on
their share ownership and that money would be used to monitor
corporate performance and research voting issues. After all, assuming the
pertinent information yields a clear choice on a voting issue, there is no
193. See supra Section I.B.1.
194. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Section I.B.3.
197. If the arrangement were a voting trust, the fiduciary duty would arise as a matter of course.
See supra note 85. If the shareholders used some other contractual arrangement to achieve the
pooling, the fiduciary duty of the person voting the shares could be created and specified in the
contract creating the arrangement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 376 (1958) (stating
that agent's fiduciary duties specified by contract creating agency).
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need for a single trustee to control the actual proxies-the individual
shareholders would all presumably vote in the appropriate way. 198
If vote-buying were necessary, or even helpful, to such shareholder
pooling arrangements, the potential shareholder benefits might justify
judicial acceptance of it. It is doubtful, however, that a permissive
approach to vote-buying would facilitate such arrangements, because it is
unlikely that votes would be "bought." Rather, shareholders would "buy"
memberships in the voting pools or trusts. By sharing the information
costs, the shareholders, as equity participants in the corporate endeavor,
would collectively benefit. While this sounds like a rational solution to
the collective action problem, there are, as a practical matter, very few
voting trusts in existence. 99 Furthermore, those that are in use operate
almost exclusively in closely held private corporations."' At first glance
this is somewhat anomalous because it would seem that the coordination
and free-rider problems would be smaller with respect to close
corporations for two reasons.2"' First, the smaller number of shareholders
makes coordination, in general, much easier. Second, closely held
corporations tend to be held within families or small groups of close
friends. The extra-corporate ties that bind these groups should help to
ameliorate any free-rider concerns through the use of social sanctions
against the free-rider.
Whatever the benefit of vote-pooling in the close corporation, the
question remains-why aren't there more such arrangements in large
public corporations? There are at least three possible answers to that
question. First, it may be that voting trusts do not really overcome the
198. The assertion that they would vote in the same manner assumes (1) that the shareholders
share the same level of risk aversion (probably a safe bet in a publicly held corporation where a
majority of the shareholders are likely diversified), (2) that no subgroup of shareholders stands to
benefit separately from the transaction underlying the vote, and (3) that there is clearly a "right" way
to vote from a shareholder wealth maximization perspective.
199. One commentator, for example, refers to the "absence of voting trusts" and offers reasons to
explain it. Barry E. Adler, Politics and Virtual Owners of the Corporation, 82 VA. L. REv. 1347,
1367 (1996). Other commentators have suggested certain disadvantages that have led to "limited use
of voting trusts." William S. Hochstetler & Mark D. Svejda, Statutory Needs of Close
Corporations-An Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General
Corporation Law?, 10 J. CORP. L. 849, 948, 1011 (1985).
200. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 65.
201. Of course, coordination and free-rider problems are not the only governance difficulties a
corporation might face. Other governance problems may be exacerbated in closely held corporations.
See infra notes 275-82 and accompanying text; see also Clark, supra note 4, at 802 ("Voting trusts
and vote pooling agreements are basically devices created to solve the peculiar and troublesome
collective action problems of closely held corporations, such as the difficulty of achieving
cooperation and avoiding voting deadlocks.").
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free-rider problem. Shareholders, after all, cannot be forced to join a
voting trust, they must do so voluntarily. With respect to the vote-
pooling or voting trust arrangements described above, there would be
little incentive to join. Any single shareholder would want others to join
the pool, but he would prefer to remain outside it himself. The
information costs are borne only by those who are members of the pool.
The information developed, however, works to the benefit of both those
in the pool and those who are not. This creates a clear incentive against
membership.
A second possibility is that membership in a voting trust or similar
arrangement would hinder (or even prevent) transfer of the shares. 2 ' All
shares in the trust are legally owned by the trustee. Even if the beneficial
owner could transfer her beneficial interest, legal ownership would
presumably remain with the trustee.2 3 That is, even upon transfer, the
shares would remain subject to the voting disability imposed by the trust.
A third possibility is that there are a number of arrangements that
approximate voting trusts, but they are not recognized as such. For
example, in a mutual fund, the members' individual funds are pooled and
then invested by the fund manager. The fund manager controls the votes
of any stocks purchased by the fund. In return for the investment services
that the manager provides, he receives a management fee. One of these
"services" is usually the voting of the shares. This is, in effect, exactly
the pooling arrangement suggested earlier. The "actual shareholders"2 4
pool their shares and then pay a third party to vote the shares
appropriately. Furthermore, the various funds are rated on their ability to
provide shareholders high returns.20 1 Thus, to the extent that shareholder
202. Conceivably, membership could impact the ability to list the shares on a national exchange.
All three national exchanges discourage actions that interfere with the voting rights assigned to
shares. See NYSE Listed Companies Manual at §§ 308, 313, available at
www.nyse.comllisted/listed.html (ast visited July 31, 2001); American Stock Exchange Listing
Standard § 122, available at www.complianceintl.comlamex (last visited July 31, 2001); Nasdaq
Rule 4351, available at www.nasdr.com (last visited July 31, 2001).
203. A related reason for the lack of voting trusts may be that the trustee is subject to capture.
That is, the concentration of voting rights within the trustee means that, if management can capture
the trustee, management is entirely insulated from shareholder discipline. See Adler, supra note 199,
at 1366-67. Concentrating the voting rights in a trust potentially facilitates such capture to the
detriment of shareholders. Of course, the trustee's fiduciary duty may impose at least some
limitations on the extent to which he or she can cooperate with management to the detriment of
shareholders.
204. That is, the mutual fund members who are the "beneficial owners" of any profits received.
205. For an example of such a rating service, see the Momingstar rating system, available at
www.momingstar.com (last visited July 31, 2001).
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voting has an effect on corporate wealth, the fund managers have an
incentive to invest the efficient amount in acquiring information and
voting the shares. 6
Whether or not mutual funds act as collective voting pools, 2 7 it is
clear that permitting vote-buying will not, as a general matter, serve as a
means of overcoming the collective action problems associated with
voting. If shareholders were attempting to use vote-buying for those
purposes, the votes should have a negative, not a positive, price. Thus,
this understanding of vote-buying simply does not provide an
explanation for cases in which charges of vote-buying have arisen (all of
which have involved positive prices for votes), nor does it provide
guidance as to how courts should handle such cases.
B. Vote-Buying and Corporate Looting
That vote-buying does not facilitate shareholder attempts to overcome
the information and coordination problems associated with voting does
not, by itself, answer the question of whether vote-buying should be
permissible. There may be other "pro-shareholder" results associated
with judicial leniency toward vote-buying. In order to further explore this
question, assume for the moment that vote-buying were legal. Two
important issues immediately come to mind: the identity of the
purchasers and the pricing mechanism in the market. An analysis of these
considerations suggests two things. First, vote-buying would permit
purchasers to exploit shareholder coordination problems and, as a result,
shareholders would sell their votes both too often and too cheaply.
Second, that purchasers are seeking votes rather than shares suggests the
purchasers do not plan to use the resulting voting power to enhance share
values.
206. This does not imply that fund managers will be active voters, only that they will be efficient.
It may be that the efficient voter does not invest in voting, preferring instead to exercise his or her
exit option (i.e., sell the shares). See generally ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 88-89.
207. There are limitations on a mutual fund's ability to do so. In particular, various legal
restrictions act to keep the percentage of stock a mutual fund owns in a single company relatively
low. For an in-depth discussion of these restrictions, see MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OWNERS 102-23 (1994). For example, under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a
(1994 & Supp. 1999), a mutual fund cannot advertise itself as "diversified" if it owns more than 10%
of the stock of a single company, and, if it owns more than 5% of the shares of a company, the fund
is treated as an affiliate and an underwriter for securities law purposes. Id. at §§ 80a-2(a), -5(b)(l).
Moreover, if the fund does not meet the requirements for diversification, adverse tax consequences
follow. ROE, supra, at 106-08.
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1. The Price of Votes and the Prisoner's Dilemma
It is likely that shareholder votes would command a very small price.
According to one commentator, in fact, any non-zero price should be
sufficient to purchase a vote.2"8 This should not be read as implying that
shareholders do not value their vote; studies indicate that non-voting
shares generally trade at a 2-4% discount from otherwise identical shares
that include voting rights.2"9 Rather, the willingness of voters to accept
low prices for their votes can best be explained by reference to collective
action problems. Assume that the issue on which the purchaser would
like to buy the vote requires a 51% majority of the shares to pass. Any
small shareholder knows that his or her vote is unlikely to matter in the
election. Thus, the shareholder has little reason not to sell his or her vote.
Further, the shareholder realizes that if he or she fails to sell the vote, and
the purchaser acquires them elsewhere, the shareholder's vote will be
meaningless but at the same time he or she will have foregone the
offered consideration.2 0 Thus, the shareholder is caught in the classic
prisoner's dilemma.2 '
208. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate
Control, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 175, 177 (1988); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 411.
209. ECONOMIC STRucrum, supra note 4, at 71. Other researchers suggest the "voting premium"
is substantially higher. See Haim Levy, Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock, 38
J. FIN. 79, 88 (1983) (citing a voting premium of 45.5%); see generally Oesterle & Palmiter, supra
note 5, at 520-21 & n.165.
210. Note that this is not the case where the only consideration is a reciprocal pledge to vote in
the same manner. There, the "consideration" has no value independent of the voting contest, and
thus the offeree does not forego anything of value by declining the offer. Thus, traditional voting
trusts or vote pooling agreements do not have the coercive effect of vote-buying arrangements.
211. Interestingly, the most recent article in favor of vote-buying assumed that the tender offer
provisions of the Williams Act would apply to vote-buying. Andr6, supra note 4, at 589 & nn.224-
28. The Williams Act, which regulates tender offers, is contained in §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1994), and the regulations thereunder, 17
C.F.t. §§ 240.13d-1 to 13e-4, 240.14a-1 to .14f-1 (2000). It requires that a person making a tender
offer for all or some percentage of a company's shares make it on equal terms to all shareholders. 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7). If the shareholders tender "too many" shares (i.e., more than the stated goal of
the tender offer), each of the tendering shareholders has the right to participate in the tender offer in
proportion to the shares he tendered. Id. § 78n(d)(6). The Williams Act was designed to ameliorate
the coercive nature of a tender offer. (A tender offer involves a prisoner's dilemma because non-
tendering shareholders may receive less for their shares than the tender price.) If the Williams Act
does indeed apply to an offer to buy votes rather than shares, it may help to nullify the coercive
nature of a vote-buying transaction. It is not at all clear, however, that the Williams Act would apply
to transactions involving the purchase of votes. Furthermore, in the context of votes, the protection
against the prisoner's dilemma is not as effective. Unlike shares, votes not tendered are completely
worthless if a sufficient number are tendered. That is, non-tendering voters have no right of
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Of course, while this is true for situations in which share ownership is
widely dispersed among numerous small shareholders, it does not hold
true when there are concentrated blocks. Imagine for instance that a
shareholder has 50% plus one of the shares of voting stock. That
shareholder would presumably not be willing to sell even a single vote
for a small price.
This suggests the following about vote-buying: to the extent that
shareholders participate both as buyers and sellers, permitting vote-
buying would tend to concentrate voting power in the hands of the
largest shareholders. Small shareholders will in general agree to accept
small prices for their votes. Similarly, small shareholders would not be
willing to pay much for the votes of others. After all, if a shareholder
owns 1% of the outstanding stock, purchasing an additional 1% of the
votes would not be likely to make that shareholder's vote dispositive.
Large shareholders, on the other hand, would have a greater incentive
to purchase votes. Assume there are one hundred shares of voting stock
in a corporation, and the largest shareholder has forty-nine of them. The
shareholder would presumably be willing to pay some amount to
purchase the additional two votes necessary to gain control of the
corporation, and, because of the prisoner's dilemma problem noted
earlier, the shareholder should have no difficulty doing just that.2"2 In
general, the larger the size of a shareholder's current holdings, the more
the shareholder would be willing to pay for votes (up to the point where
he or she obtains a sufficient number of votes to ensure the desired level
of control).213
In sum, large shareholders may be able to avoid the coercive aspects
of a vote purchase offer. In publicly-held corporations with widely-
dispersed share ownership, however, coordination difficulties among the
shareholders will permit vote purchases on the cheap.
appraisal. Cf. e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (1996) (providing that after merger dissenting
voters have right of appraisal for their shares).
212. Each of the remaining shareholders must, in effect, compete with the others to sell two votes.
Since the value of the remaining votes after the sale is zero, the competitive price should approach
zero.
213. Assume a corporation that has 100 issued and outstanding shares. If a shareholder has one
share, purchasing an additional vote provides her with 1/50th of the remaining votes needed. If, on
the other hand, the shareholder has thirty-five shares, an additional vote represents 1/15th of the
remaining voting power required. Thus, the latter shareholder should be willing to pay more. Of
course, if the shareholder already holds an outcome-determinative number of votes, he or she would
presumably be unwilling to pay anything for the remaining votes.
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2. Who Buys Votes?
If a potential vote purchaser believes that a certain outcome on a
shareholder voting issue will result in increased corporate wealth, the
purchaser's best option is to purchase the shares, not the votes. By
purchasing the shares, the shareholder will acquire the entire increase in
wealth associated with the purchased shares. If the shareholder purchases
only the vote, he or she will merely capture the gain in wealth associated
with those shares previously owned. Thus, if a potential purchaser has
the option to purchase either the shares or the votes and chooses the
latter, it suggests that the purchaser is not intending to use the vote for
reasons that would increase corporate wealth, but rather to "loot""14 the
corporation.
Who are likely candidates for looting through vote acquisition? As
described previously, one class of vote purchasers could be the large
shareholder. It is not clear, however, that this group is likely to use vote
buying to engage in looting. Large shareholders extracting wealth from a
corporation also hurt themselves in their capacity as shareholders. For
example, assume a 40% shareholder extracts $1 from the corporation
through his or her purchase of voting control. Even if the extraction is
costless,15 the shareholder's net benefit is only sixty cents. Forty cents of
the dollar already "belonged" to the shareholder. From this sixty cents,
the costs of purchasing the votes 16 must also be subtracted. Thus, in
general, the greater the percentage stake a shareholder owns, the less the
shareholder's incentive to engage in vote-buying to loot the company.1
214. "Looting' refers to the improper extraction of wealth from the corporate form, for instance
through excessive salaries, sale of corporate outputs or assets at an artificially low price, or purchase
of corporate inputs at an artificially high price. See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 129-31;
Clark, supra note 4, at 795.
215. There may be some costs, such as "cover up" costs, associated with the transfer. The
magnitude of those costs will depend both on the difficulty of concealing the transfer, as well as the
legal rules surrounding such transfers.
216. The costs referred to here include both the purchase price for the votes as well as the costs,
such as communication costs, associated with making the offer and undertaking the purchase.
217. Indeed, in a permissive vote-buying regime, the large shareholder may often be forced into
the role of "reluctant purchaser." That is, if a potential looter makes an offer for shareholder votes,
the large shareholder may find it necessary to bid against the looter in order to protect the value of
the shareholder's stake in the company. While at least one commentator has suggested that the
potential for competing bids serves to protect shareholder vote sellers from the coercive nature of the
prisoner's dilemma, see Levmore, supra note 2, at 139, as this example indicates, the possibility of
such a bidding war may result in a coercive wealth transfer away from large shareholders.
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Even so, a permissive attitude toward vote-buying would provide at
least some additional possibilities for looting by large shareholders.
While the large shareholder has, in some sense, a pre-existing "claim" to
some portion of the corporate dollar, the shareholder would no doubt
prefer the entirety to that portion, thereby providing the shareholder an
incentive for vote-purchases to solidify control. In a regime that banned
vote-buying, by contrast, the large shareholder seeking to obtain greater
control to facilitate looting would need to acquire additional shares in
order to do so. Requiring the "looting shareholder" to purchase shares
rather than votes would likely diminish such looting for two reasons.
First, purchasing shares would be more expensive than purchasing votes
alone, thus increasing the price of obtaining the desired level of control.
Second, the harm imposed on others by the shareholder's looting would
be diminished." 8 In essence, a ban on vote-buying would force the
shareholder to internalize a greater portion of the costs imposed by the
looting.
Other corporate constituency groups are in even better position to use
vote-buying to engage in looting because they can do so while suffering
none of the detrimental effects associated with share ownership in the
looted firm. Three prime examples of this are management, vendors, and
customers. Management could derive benefits from controlling the vote
even absent any ownership in the underlying shares. Because of the role
it plays in the corporation, management can often extract benefits to the
disadvantage of the shareholders. 1 9 By taking the shareholder's vote and
placing it with management, these problems are exacerbated;
management simply has greater control and hence a greater ability to
loot. Furthermore, by allowing management to control the vote (one of
the other monitoring mechanisms), the threat of a hostile takeover is
impaired: management can use its purchased shareholder voting power to
prevent the takeover transaction. The ability of management to inflict
harm on the shareholders is especially pronounced in situations where
management purchases the right to vote for an extended period of time.22°
218. That is, if the shareholder's stake increases from 40% to 60%, S0.60, rather than SO.40, of
every dollar "looted" already "belonged" to the shareholder. As a result, harms to the remaining
shareholders are proportionately reduced.
219. For example, management can raise salaries, create generous retirement plans, or provide
extravagant corporate perquisites. See Andrd, supra note 4, at 598-99.
220. For instance, in a successful dual-class recapitalization, management shareholders can
acquire effectively complete control for a period of unlimited duration. See id. at 620-21.
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However, it still presents a problem even if the management purchases
the vote on an issue by issue basis.
Similarly, allowing corporate vendors or customers to control the vote
could be detrimental to a corporation. Either of these groups could use
the vote to install board members "friendly" to their causes, or use this
possibility to gain "converts" among the current board. This possibility
could result in the corporation continuing contracts on terms less
favorable than could be obtained elsewhere, thus redirecting corporate
profits from shareholders to these outside groups.
This analysis suggests the following general rules. Those desiring to
profit from control by an increase in share values are unlikely to buy
votes; they would prefer to obtain control by purchasing the additional
shares rather than merely the votes. The groups that prefer to purchase
votes without the underlying shares are likely to do so because they
intend to loot the company. Thus, a legal rule legitimizing vote-buying
increases the risk of looting, particularly when the vote purchaser is a
non-shareholder, and courts should be particularly leery of such
transactions.
C. Vote-Buying and Coercive Transfers Between Different Classes of
Corporate Participants
Even where the purchasers are shareholders rather than corporate
insiders, vote-buying still presents another potential problem. It may be
employed to create coercive wealth transfers between different "classes"
of corporate participants. This Section examines two important vote-
buying cases and concludes that they may well be examples of just such
coercive transfers. The possibility that it could be used to effect such
transfers argues strongly against permitting unrestricted vote-buying.
There are many different "classes" of corporate participants.
Bondholders, shareholders, preferred shareholders, creditors, to name
just a few, all derive substantial economic benefit from the existence of
the corporation. The nature of the economic benefit varies greatly
between these groups, however, with regard to the nature of the financial
risk, the payment mechanisms employed, the -term of the investment, the
available exit options, and many other characteristics. Even among a
single group such as shareholders, there may be separate classes,"1 each
221. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 8, § 151(a) (1991 & Supp. 2000):
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representing a different claim on the residual assets or earnings of the
corporation.
The previous Section addressed the manner in which management and
suppliers could use vote-buying to the detriment of the shareholder.
However, a closer examination of two cases indicates that the various
classes of corporate investors can also use vote-buying to better their
position relative to investors in other classes.
1. Extorting Wealth from Bondholders: Lessons from Kass
Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 222 presents an example of just this type
of inter-class conflict. As described previously, 2 3 Kass involved a
conflict between corporate shareholders and bondholders. The
shareholders desired to undertake a merger in a manner that required the
relaxation of certain covenants in some of the outstanding bonds.2 4 The
company sought to purchase with cash and flight coupons the
bondholders' consent to amend the covenants.225  Some of the
bondholders attempted to enjoin the offer as impermissible vote-buying,
but, using a Schreiber analysis, the court upheld the transaction.226
The problem with the court's holding is that it did not reflect an
important difference between the economic reality of Schreiber and that
of Kass. In Schreiber, although the shares were different classes, the
residual interest in the corporation was fairly similar. In Kass, by
contrast, the nature of the economic interest between the disputing
parties was quite different. Bondholders do not share in increased
corporate growth. They have a fixed upside potential, the stated interest
rate, but they do share in corporate losses, at least if those losses cause
the corporation to default on its indebtedness. Thus, bondholders as a
group tend to be risk averse. 27 They would prefer a corporation make
Every corporation may issue 1 or more classes of stock or I or more series of stock within any
class thereof, any or all of which classes ... or series may have such voting powers ... and such
designations, preferences and relative, participating, optional or other special rights, and
qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof, as shall be stated and expressed in the
certificate of incorporation ....
222. 1986 WL 13008 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986).
223. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
224. Kass, 1986 WL 13008 at *1.
225. Id. at *2.
226. Id. at *5.
227. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 181 (1989):
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"safe" choices because they are not rewarded when risky ventures pay
off."2  Shareholders, on the other hand, have unlimited upside
participation. Increases in profits increase shareholder wealth. Thus, they
are, in general, more willing to see the corporation adopt a greater risk
level.Y
Bondholders, recognizing this divergence in risk tolerance, generally
require covenants in bonds giving them the right to veto certain corporate
acts, such as mergers or acquisitions, which can significantly affect the
risk of the investment." ° Kass can be seen as a case where the
shareholders, acting through the board, deprived the bondholders of the
protections offered by these covenants.
In Kass, each bondholder found itself in a prisoner's dilemma. Their
consent was not likely to influence the outcome of the election.
However, if an individual bondholder failed to consent, but the required
number of bondholders did, the individual bondholder would be forced
to accept the amended covenants without receiving the benefit of the
cash offered by the company. The rational choice for each bondholder in
this situation was to accept the compensation and give its consent. This
was true even if the compensation was not sufficient to offset the
additional risk incurred by the bondholders. By allowing the transaction,
the court arguably allowed the shareholders to increase their wealth at
the expense of the bondholders.
The most important manifestation of the conflict of interest between fixed claimants and
shareholders lies in their attitudes toward the optimal level of risk that a firm should take.
Shareholders have a powerful incentive to induce their firms to engage in activities that fixed
claimants would consider excessively risky. This is because shareholders stand to reap all of the
benefits from the spectacular success of a particularly risky activity, but stand to lose only the
amount of their initial capital investment. Fixed claimants, in contrast, do no better when their
firm performs very well than when their firm garners only a moderate return. For this reason,
shareholders generally retain the right to control most details of a firm's business, subject to the
broad contractual protections that fixed claimants extract to protect themselves against default.
See also Thomas E. Stagg & Scott Ferretti, Contractual Protection: An Existing Remedy for
Bondholder Distress, 4 ST. JOHN'S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 245, 253 (1989) ("The bondholder is
generally viewed as more risk averse than the stockholder and has a direct interest in preserving
corporate capital and earnings in order to maximize firm value.").
228. See ECONOMIC STRUCTuRE, supra note 4, at 68; Macey, supra note 227, at 181.
229. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web,
85 MICH. I- REv. 1, 19 (1986) (describing shareholders with a diversified portfolio as risk neutral,
or even risk preferring); Macey, supra note 227, at 181; Stagg & Ferretti, supra note 227, at 252-55
(explaining why shareholders have a higher risk tolerance than bondholders).
230. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 68.
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It is important to realize that it is not the transfer of wealth per se that
was objectionable, but rather the means by which it was achieved. The
shareholders, acting collectively through the board, were able to exploit a
collective action problem among the bondholders to change the terms of
the contract between these two groups. Allowing this type of exploitation
results in higher bond rates in general and inefficient pricing of bonds.23" '
Under the holding in Kass, bonds can be converted to covenant-free
bonds at a relatively low price. 232 However, that in turn implies that
lenders will provide little discount for accepting covenants in the first
place. Because covenants exist in most debt instruments, they must, as a
general rule, improve the wealth of both parties to the transaction. By
reducing bondholder reliance on such covenants, consent-buying reduces
the magnitude of this wealth.
One potential response by lenders could be to insist upon covenants
that cannot be altered even by consent. This approach, however, would
also result in deleterious wealth effects. Such immutable covenants
would in effect result in precommitment strategies without exit options.
Thus, even if both lender and borrower truly wanted to change the terms
of the agreement, it would be difficult to achieve.233
Another alternative would be for bondholders to form representative
committees similar to the board of directors. By forming such
committees, the individual bondholder would escape the prisoner's
dilemma because each could be guaranteed concerted action among all of
the bondholders. Of course, by adopting a board, the bondholders would
incur some of the same agency costs currently experienced by corporate
shareholders. And, in any event, creating such a board would increase
transaction costs associated with the issuance of corporate debt, once
again raising the rates from those in a world where the bondholders could
not be coercively deprived of the benefit of their covenants through vote-
buying. All in all, it seems likely that ex ante, both shareholders and
231. For an argument that bondholders are not necessarily subject to coercion in Kass-type
consent solicitation, see Royce De R. Barondes, supra note 187, at 754. Barondes suggests that
bondholders avoid coercion because the consent solicitation process is more accurately modeled as a
repeat game rather than a single-shot game. Id.
232. The court in Kass did not undertake an intrinsic fairness analysis to see if the price paid
accurately reflected the value of the covenants given up. See Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 1986
WL 13008 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986). Note that in general this could prove to be a very difficult
determination for a court to make.
233. Conceivably, if both agreed, the borrower could issue the lender a new bond with different
covenants and use the proceeds to retire the old debenture. The transaction costs on such a swap
(e.g., the costs of complying with securities law requirements) could, however, prove prohibitive.
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bondholders would be better off in a world that did not permit
shareholders to purchase consents. By failing to recognize the coercive
nature of the transaction at issue, the Kass court erred in its decision.
2. Schreiber as a Rubinstein Game.
Even Schreiber can be viewed as an example of the use of vote-
buying to effect a coercive wealth transfer between corporate
participants. In Schreiber, the corporate bylaws required approval by a
majority of each of three voting classes to approve a merger. 4 A single
shareholder owned a majority of the shares in one of the classes, and thus
could maintain a blocking position on the corporate reorganization."
Everyone, including the blocking shareholder, agreed that the merger
would increase corporate wealth, but the blocking shareholder would not
agree to it until he extracted a presumably below market rate loan. 6
Although the court did not endeavor to name the price, the favorable
terms could, of course, be translated into a cash equivalent. Thus, in
reality, Schreiber involved an attempt by one shareholder to extract
wealth from other shareholders through use of his blocking position.
Of course, this case is different from Kass in that the economic
interests of the shareholders in Schreiber were all the same. That is, all of
the shareholders would presumably benefit from an action expected to
increase share value. Because the interests among both vote-sellers and
vote-buyers were aligned, the coercive transfer must have been
accomplished somewhat differently than in Kass. 37 After all, as the
interests were the same, at first glance it seems that the other classes of
stock could just as easily have demanded that their votes be purchased.
In other words, it appears that the other shareholders could have rejected
the blocking shareholder's demand for a loan. If they had, it would
presumably have been in his interest to acquire a loan from secondary
234. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 19 (Del. Ch. 1982). For general discussion of the facts of
this case, see supra notes 128-50 and accompanying text.
235. Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 19.
236. Id. at 19-20. Jet Capital's management stated that a market rate loan was too expensive, so
the 5% rate offered by Texas Air was presumably below market rate. The court does not indicate the
magnitude of the difference between the terms offered and the market rate. Id. at 19.
237. The key in Kass was that the shareholders (vote-buyers) and the bondholders (vote-sellers)
had a divergence in interest. See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
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sources and then still vote for the merger.23' How then was the blocking
shareholder able to complete his extraction?
In essence, the negotiations between the shareholders could be
modeled as a Rubinstein game.23 In the basic Rubinstein game, two
parties must agree on how to split some sum of money.24 Here, the
increase in corporate wealth resulting from the merger is the sum that
must be split between the players. Furthermore, there is pressure on the
players to complete the negotiations as quickly as possible.24' For
simplicity purposes, then, Schreiber can be modeled as a game involving
two players, A representing the blocking shareholder and B representing
the remaining shareholders. 42 Both A and B will gain from permitting
the merger, the only issue is the extent to which each gains.243 The fact
that in Schreiber the blocking shareholder (A) was able to extract the
loan suggests a few possible alternatives.
The course of Rubinstein bargaining is strongly affected by the exit
options open to the players. 2" Here, however, there is no exit option for
splitting the gains. The only exit option open to the players other than a
successful negotiation is to forego the gains entirely. The Rubinstein
model predicts that in such a splitting game, if there is perfect
information, the players will split the gains evenly. 45 This should imply
238. Presumably, with a loan, the merger would have a positive value for the shareholder. Thus,
unless the "cost" of the loan exceeded the benefit of the merger (see infra notes 242-47 and
accompanying text), the shareholder would obtain the loan and vote for the merger.
239. See Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, in 50 ECONOMETRICA 97-
110 (1982); see also BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 219-41 (1992) (discussing the
Rubinstein game).
240. BAJRD ET AL., supra note 239, at 224-32.
241. Due to the speed with which business conditions change, merger negotiations are often very
time-sensitive. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1296 (1999) ("Many mergers, especially ones
involving publicly traded companies, are often extremely time-sensitive since changes in reported
profits or stock prices are likely to unravel any deal over time.").
242. The remaining shareholders could, of course, also be blocking shareholders. The reason one
shareholder was able to assume that position while others were not is examined infra notes 250-51
and accompanying text.
243. There can be no doubt that the blocking shareholder will benefit from the merger after the
loan, otherwise he would continue to oppose it.
244. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 239, at 224-32.
245. Id. at 224. More formally, Rubinstein predicts that the two players will split the one dollar so
that player 1 receives 1/(I+S), and player 2 receives 6/(1+ 8), where & = 1/(l+r) and r is the per
period interest rate of the players. Id. at 223-24. See also ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR
APPLIED ECONOMISTS 68-71 (1992) (providing inductive mathematical proof of this result). When
the time period between offers becomes arbitrarily short, however, r - 0, and thus 6 - 0, meaning
both player I and player 2 receive 1/(1+1) or 2 of the dollar. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 239, at 224.
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that in Schreiber, the gains would be split on a per share basis, and A
would not be able to extract any wealth from the other shareholders.
In reality, however, such a division of the gains may not actually have
been "even." In order to benefit from the transaction, A was required to
exercise his warrants, which required obtaining a loan. Thus, A was
required to incur a cost246 that B was not.247 Obtaining the loan from B24 8
might then be seen as a means of splitting this cost in order to arrive at an
even split of the net profit from the transaction.249
If this is indeed the case, the result of the vote-buying transaction may
not be coercive. In fact, vote-buying may allow beneficial transactions to
go forward that otherwise would not. To see this, assume that if A
doesn't exercise his warrants, the merger will indeed result in negative
profits to him personally. However, if A does exercise the warrants, both
A and B will benefit by $5. Further assume that it would cost A $6 to
obtain the loan. A will not be willing to spend the $6 to benefit by $5,
even though in the aggregate the benefits ($10) exceed the costs ($6). By
allowing the remaining shareholders to "buy" A's vote, they can share
the $6 cost. Indeed, if such cost sharing is allowed, presumably all
transactions that are beneficial in the aggregate would occur. Thus, if this
were an accurate assessment of what is taking place, vote-buying may be
beneficial.
Yet, it is difficult to ascertain whether this is truly taking place. For
instance, the "sharing" could easily be skewed by the presence of
asymmetric information. Presumably, both A (the blocking shareholder)
and B (the remaining shareholders) knew the projected increase in share
value resulting from the merger. Thus, A knew B's true valuation of the
merger. As discussed previously, however, A had costs associated with
the transaction that B did not. Furthermore, B was not necessarily in a
good position to know or even accurately estimate those costs; 50 B may
Note this result remains unchanged even if the two players have different discount rates (i.e., player
1 has a different r and 8 than player 2). Id.
246. For example, the origination cost of the loan.
247. The other shareholders were engaging in tax-free swaps. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17,
19 (Del. Ch. 1982).
248. The loan was obtained from the corporation, which can be viewed for these purposes as the
representative of B (the other shareholders).
249. The net profit would be the increase in shareholder wealth minus the costs associated with
the loan.
250. Remember, B is in reality a group of shareholders. As discussed previously, there are
collective action problems associated with the group acquisition of information. See supra Section
I.B.
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simply have accepted A's estimate of the costs. If the "net" profits are
skewed by A's overblown estimate of its costs, then B may end up "over-
reimbursing" A.
This is a slightly less palatable explanation. If B is in the position of
being "forced" to rely on A's estimate of his costs because of the
collective action problems associated with information gathering, then A
can extract a certain amount of additional wealth from B by
misrepresenting those costs.
Finally, the negotiations in Schreiber could be viewed as a breakdown
in the Rubinstein model. The blocking shareholder in Schreiber was a
single entity. The other party, by contrast, was a group. The group may
have faced collective action problems in the bargaining process that the
blocking shareholder did not. For instance, counter-offers may have been
very difficult for the group to propose. If counter-offers are relatively
more expensive, they are relatively less likely to be made.
In order to avoid this problem, the shareholder group in Schreiber
used the board as its negotiating representative. However, this in turn
may have created an agency problem. The blocking shareholder, for
instance, may have been able to "capture" the board, resulting in less
forceful negotiations on behalf of the remaining shareholders.2"' Either
way, this could be seen as an example of the blocking shareholder
exploiting the collective nature of his "opponent."
Independent of which of these explanations best describes what took
place in Schreiber, it is not clear that vote-buying is desirable in cases
like this. By permitting it, the courts allow the opportunity for additional
negotiations regarding the distribution of the surplus from a corporate
reorganization. These negotiations involve transaction costs including
delays in the completion of deals. Against these costs, the only benefit to
allowing vote-buying in cases such as Schreiber is to permit transactions
to go forward that are beneficial in the aggregate, but detrimental to
certain shareholders. It does this by permitting the benefiting parties to
share their gains with the injured shareholders.
251. Of course, if this were the case, the shareholders could conceivably have a cause of action
against the board for breach of fiduciary duty. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (noting that in merger context, board has duty to maximize
shareholder values); Christian C. Day, Corporate Governance, Conrail, and the Market: Getting on
the Right Track!, 26 J. CORP. L. 1, 16 (2000) (explaining that in merger context board has duty,
typically referred to as "Revlon duty," to maximize shareholder value). It is likely, however, that
even to the extent such a fiduciary duty were to exist, absent gross misconduct, the Business
Judgment Rule would make it difficult to proceed on such a claim. See Day, supra, at 15-24
(discussing Business Judgment Rule in context of merger negotiations).
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In general, however, this would involve a very small percentage of
cases. Shareholders' interests are usually very closely aligned. That
which benefits one (in his or her capacity as a shareholder) generally
benefits all. Even in those cases where vote-buying is arguably
beneficial, collective action problems and asymmetric information could
permit small groups of shareholders in control positions to use it to
extract wealth from the remaining shareholders. Thus, even those vote-
buying cases involving solely purchases among shareholders, vote-
buying is still potentially harmful, and there is reason to suspect that
courts are incapable of recognizing and policing the harm When it occurs.
D. Vote-Buying as a Means of Facilitating Control Transactions
As the previous sections demonstrate, vote-buying presents the
possibility of corporate looting and/or coercive wealth transfers between
corporate participants.2 2 Commentators have suggested, however, that
the potential benefit of vote-buying as a means to overcome the
shareholder costs imposed by "shareholder rights plans" justifies
permissive treatment of vote-buying, notwithstanding these identified
costs. 3 This Section addresses their arguments, concluding that while its
use as a means of overcoming shareholder rights plans may provide
some benefits, the same benefits could be obtained through use of
turnout incentives, without incurring the potential harms vote-buying
presents.
It is widely recognized that the possibility of corporate acquisition is
generally beneficial to shareholders. 4 As described above, collective
252. See supra notes 214-39 and accompanying text.
253. See generally Andre, supra note 4, at 585-606 (suggesting that courts should permit vote-
buying as a means around anti-takeover statutes); see also Hasen, supra note 1, at 1349-52
(suggesting that vote-buying permits potential acquirers to overcome shareholder rights plans,
thereby enhancing corporate efficiency); Levmore, supra note 2, at 138 (suggesting that vote-buying
is pro-shareholder). For discussion of a related idea, see Clark, supra note 4, at 806-07 (suggesting
that vote-buying should be allowed by shareholders who are planning to recoup their investment by
an increase in the share price of the company's stock).
254. See, eg., Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender
Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L REV. 277, 291-92 (1984) (arguing that management adoption of defensive
tactics is contrary to shareholder interests); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the,
Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L REV. 1, 9
(1978) ("The market for corporate control and the threat of cash tender offers in particular are of
great importance in creating incentives for management to maximize the welfare of shareholders.");
Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific
Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) (finding that corporate takeovers benefit the shareholders, the
bidding firm, and create positive gains).
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action problems among shareholders can prevent effective monitoring of
corporate managers, leading to entrenched (mis)management and
resulting loss in shareholder value. 2"5 Acquirers seek to purchase control
positions in companies suffering from such mismanagement and replace
the existing management with better managers, thereby capturing the
gains associated with the increased productivity. The monitoring effect
created by the potential for such transactions provides a useful tool for
keeping the current management focused on creating shareholder
value.256
During the late 1980s, however, managers (often with the help of state
legislatures) had largely succeeded in protecting themselves from the
threat of hostile takeovers through the use of sophisticated takeover
defenses.2 7 These defenses generally fell into two categories: anti-
takeover statutes and "shareholder rights plans," the latter of which were
often euphemistically referred to by more colorful names such as "poison
pills" and "shark repellents.""25 The defenses were designed to allow
incumbent managers to thwart the ability of corporate outsiders to effect
changes in corporate control through share acquisition. 2 9 Basically, the
defenses adopt provisions whereby, in the event an "unfriendly" suitor
purchases a threshold number of shares in the company, some adverse
consequence follows. 26  For example, the newly-acquired shares might
255. See supra notes 17-47 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 254, at 9.
257. John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model
of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1313, 1337-53 (1992) (discussing tools management
uses to insulate itself from threat of ouster).
258. For an in-depth description of the poison pill defense, see Matheson, supra note 9, at 726-
33.
259. See Lucian A. Bebchuck & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory
Competition, 87 VA. L. REv. 111, 119 (2001); William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate
Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715, 752 (1998) (discussing purpose of antitakeover statutes); Alan E.
Garfield, Evaluating State Anti-Takeover Legislation: A Broadminded New Approach to
Corporation Law or "A Race to the Bottom?," 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 119, 126 (1990) ("By
attempting to stop takeovers, the [antitakeover] statutes serve only one purpose: to entrench current
management in power.").
The most powerful tool to incumbents in impeding bids was the poison pill. The pill provided
managers with a highly effective, easy, and costless way to impede an unwelcome bid. Unlike
other defensive tactics (such as a target company's defensive acquisition of other companies)
that have some effect in the world other than stopping a bid, the pill is an artifice whose only
upshot is impeding a bidder.
260. For instance, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAm., 481 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1987), involved an
Indiana statute providing that whenever a purchaser gained more than 20% control of a corporation,
the shareholder would be precluded from voting unless a majority of the disinterested shareholders
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not be permitted to vote, or the corporation might issue a share dividend
to all but the newly acquired shares, thereby diluting the acquirer's
interest. 2
61
Of course, these shareholder rights plans and antitakeover statutes
drastically reduced the incentive to attempt a hostile takeover by share
acquisition.262 As a result, incumbent managers may remain in place,
resulting in continued inefficient use of corporate assets, or, alternatively,
the acquirers may be forced to negotiate a side deal with the board prior
to acquisition, thereby turning the hostile takeover into a "friendly"
acquisition.263 In essence, the board holds the corporate assets captive,
releasing them only if the acquirer pays ransom, thereby reducing the
gain available to be shared between the existing shareholders and the
acquirer.
Commentators have suggested that vote-buying presents a possible
solution to the problem of management that has entrenched itself through
use of shareholder rights plans or anti-takeover statutes.26' The basic
theory is that acquirers could purchase the vote, and then use it to
dismantle the protections by replacing the board with one friendly to the
265acquisition.
It certainly seems correct as an initial matter that vote-buying in such
situations is not suggestive of corporate looting. The presumption of
looting arises due to the purchaser's choice to purchase votes rather than
shares.266 In the face of the adverse consequences under an anti-takeover
statute or shareholder rights plan, however, the purchase of the vote does
not indicate a preference for the vote over the share. Rather, the vote
purchase is but the first step in the share purchase.
approved the voting rights. Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348-49 (Del. 1985),
involved a shareholder rights plan that allowed purchase of the corporate shares at depressed prices
in the event of an attempted takeover.
261. CS Corp., 481 U.S. at 73-74; see also Matheson, supra note 9, at 726-29 (discussing the
various types of poison pills companies have adopted).
262. See Matheson, supra note 9, at 726-29.
263. See Bebchuck & Ferrell, supra note 259, at 121, stating that:
The poison pill, backed by an entrenched management, is extremely formidable. Incumbent
management can use this power to prevent an acquisition that they do not want for self-serving
purposes (such as saving their jobs). They can also use this power to extract private benefits for
themselves, perhaps diverted from what would have otherwise gone to the shareholders, in
return for redeeming the pill and allowing the tender offer to proceed.
264. See supra note 253.
265. See generally Andr6, supra note 4, at 585-606.
266. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
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Although facilitating control transactions may be a laudable goal, the
efficacy of vote-buying as a means of achieving that goal is questionable
for at least three reasons. First, if vote-buying is generally recognized as
legal, shareholder rights plans and anti-takeover statutes will
undoubtedly adjust to prevent "end runs" accomplished through its use.
Indeed, shareholder rights plans typically are triggered by the acquisition
of "beneficial" as well as actual ownership of shares, and "beneficial
ownership" is typically defined to include the acquisition of a share's
voting right.26 7 Thus, vote-buying would be no more effective than share
acquisition in dismantling such plans.
Second, while the possibility of takeovers is undoubtedly beneficial to
shareholders, not all takeover bids are necessarily in the shareholders'
best interest.2 68 For example, given additional time, a competing bid for a
company at a higher price might appear. The choice of whether or not to
proceed with a given takeover transaction, then, should be left to the
shareholders. If vote-buying is permissible, however, shareholders would
be generally incapable of resisting the vote purchase due to the collective
action problems they face.269 In light of those problems, the act of
tendering the proxy would not necessarily be indicative of the
shareholder's preferred outcome on the takeover transaction, but rather
merely a reflection of the coercive nature of the vote purchase offer.
Third, vote-buying might present a new opportunity for corporate
outsiders to obtain wealth-diverting transfer payments from corporate
management. That is, a purchaser might employ a vote-buying
transaction for the stated purpose of acquiring sufficient votes to move
forward with an acquisition. As described above, at least in a corporation
with dispersed ownership, it should be possible to purchase the votes
267. For example, Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 1573 (Del. Ch. 1990), involved just
such a plan. The shareholder rights plan was triggered by a shareholder attaining beneficial
ownership of a 15% or greater stake in the company. Id. at 1577. The plan specifically defined
beneficial ownership to include acquisition of the voting right of a share. Id. at 1580. The court
concluded that under the language of the plan even acquisition of a revocable proxy would constitute
beneficial ownership. Id. at 1585-86.
268. See Lucian A. Bebchuck, The Case For Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1028, 1052-55 (1982) (suggesting that shareholders in the target company achieve benefits
when management resists a takeover long enough to permit competing bids to develop); Jim Chen &
Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms andFirms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361,
425 (1997) (discussing argument that "shareholders often benefit from the increased ability of
management to resist a takeover"); Alessandro Portolano, The Decision to Adopt Defensive Tactics
in Italy, 20 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON., 425, 429-30 (2000) (noting that resistance to takeover bids can
generate benefits for target company shareholders).
269. See supra notes 234-58 and accompanying text.
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quite cheaply.270 Rather than complete the control acquisition through
share purchase, however, the purchaser might instead use the votes (and
the threat of a control transaction) to negotiate a transfer payment from
the board in exchange for not going forward-that is, extract
"greenmail. ''21 In short, while it is indisputable that shareholder rights
plans and anti-takeover statutes impose costs on shareholders, vote-
buying does not necessarily eradicate those costs, and it may in fact
impose additional ones.
A better response to the problem of shareholder rights plans, one that
captures the benefits of vote-buying without presenting the harms, would
be the use of a variant of vote-buying turnout incentives.272 Under the
turnout incentive approach, the shareholder would be paid for voting,
independent of the voting option the shareholder selects.273 Such
payments would increase participation in corporate governance because,
as noted above, voting is not costless. Even if the voting information is
collected and provided to the shareholders, the cost of reviewing and
analyzing that information may cause rational apathy among
shareholders. A system that paid the shareholder an incentive fee for
returning his or her proxy, independent of the shareholder's choice of
270. See id.
271. "Greenmail" refers to corporate payments made to potential acquirers in exchange for the
acquirer dropping the acquisition plan. For a general discussion of greenmail, see Jonathan R. Macey
& Edward S. McChesney, A TheoreticalAnalysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE UJ. 13 (1985).
While these authors suggest the possibility that greenmail may have some beneficial effects for
shareholders, id. at 24-25, it is well accepted that such payments hold at least the potential for harm
to shareholder interests. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics:
A Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE I.J. 295, 320 (1986) (arguing that the abusive potential of
greenmail justifies an outright ban on the practice); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside
Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L REv. 898,
934 (1996). The directors' fiduciary duties may provide some limits on their ability to protect their
positions through use of greenmail. As a general matter, however, courts have upheld such payments
in the past as appropriate exercises of directorial discretion. See, e.g., Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531,
537 (Del. 1986) (holding that purchase of raider's block of shares at premium not an abuse of
directors' discretion); Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. Ch. 1987) (dismissing shareholder
derivative claims predicated on alleged greenmail payment by General Motor's board to Ross Perot).
272. For a discussion of the use of turnout incentives in political contests, see Hasen, supra note
1, at 1355-59.
273. Responsibility for the costs of the turnout incentives could be similar to proxy solicitations.
The challenging party would bear the cost of paying the incentives, but could recoup those payments
out of corporate assets in the event that it was successful, or at the discretion of the directors if it was
unsuccessful. See, eg., Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (holding that
successful proxy opponents can claim reimbursement); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane
Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291,293 (N.Y. 1955) (holding that a corporation, at its option, could reimburse a
successful rival faction for expenses incurred in a policy fight).
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who received the proxy, would increase shareholder participation
without coercively depriving the shareholder of her voice. In other
words, the shareholder is no longer compelled to tender his or her vote or
face the prospect that it will be worthless. Instead, the shareholder's vote
has the same value (the turnout incentive amount) independent of the
group for whom it is cast.
In this way, the shareholders have an incentive to review the materials
and participate in the voting contest.274 If the proposed takeover is truly
in the shareholder's interest, the shareholder would presumably still
tender his or her vote to the acquirer. Because that tender resulted from a
turnout incentive, rather than a vote purchase, however, it would be a
reliable indicator of the shareholder's true preference rather than a
reflection of the coercive nature of the transaction.
IV. VOTE-BUYING AS A TOOL FOR PREFERENCE
AGGREGATION IN CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
Up until this point, the primary focus of the discussion has been vote-
buying in large publicly held corporations. Closely held corporations, by
contrast, provide significantly different regulatory concerns. 25 Although
the case law draws no distinction between vote-buying in publicly held
and closely held corporations,"' the different nature of the regulatory
concerns between the two suggests a more permissive approach to vote-
buying with regard to the latter.
In closely held corporations, information and coordination problems
tend to be minimized. The blocks of stock are usually much larger on a
percentage basis,277 so the various shareholders have greater incentives to
invest in information. Furthermore, most of the shareholders are also
274. This is not to suggest that turnout incentives would provide a panacea. For instance, a
rational shareholder may consider it profit maximizing to decide how to vote based on a coin flip. In
that way, the shareholder would receive the turnout incentive without incurring the analysis costs
associated with reviewing the information.
275. See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 4, at 228-52; Moll, supra note 103, at 756-58
(describing differences between close corporations and traditional public corporations and
suggesting that "[c]onventional corporate law norms of majority rule and centralized control can
lead to serious problems for the close corporation minority shareholder").
276. Compare Henley Group, Inc. v. Sante Fe S. Pac. Corp., No. CIV. A. No. 9569, 1988 WL
23945, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 1988) (discussing a widely held corporation), with Rainbow
Navigation, Inc. v. Yonge, CIV. A. No. 9432, 1989 WL 40805, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1989)
(discussing a closely held corporation).
277. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02
(3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2000) (defining close corporation as one with relatively few shareholders).
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active within the corporation, providing them with better access to
information than an outside shareholder might have.278 In addition,
because the shareholders work together and often have familial or social
bonds, the free-rider problem is less prevalent. 79 Thus, many of the
problems facing shareholders in large corporations with widely-dispersed
ownership simply do not exist, or are, at any rate, much less acute, in
small, closely held corporations.28
At the same time, other problems may replace these concerns. For
instance, in closely held corporations, it may be less likely that there are
uni-peaked preferences.28" ' This, in turn, can generate instabilities in the
shareholder voting process such as path-dependent outcomes or
cycling.28
2
There are a number of reasons to suspect that multi-peaked
preferences may exist in closely held corporations. For the typical
shareholder in a publicly held corporation, the shareholder's stake is
merely part of the shareholder's diversified portfolio. Because of the
protection offered through diversification, the average shareholder is thus
likely to be risk neutral.283 In closely held corporations, on the other
hand, one might expect a broader spectrum of risk aversion. Many of the
shareholders (e.g., the entrepreneur in a start-up, or the manager/owners
following a management-leveraged buyout) may have their entire
savings, or at least a very significant portion of it, invested in the
company. In addition, they may have a significant portion of their human
278. Id. at § 1.08.
279. Id. at § 1.02; see also Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation,
15 J. CoRp. L 377, 392 (1990) ("A close corporation provides more direct opportunity for specific
private ordering because there exists no large-numbers problem that can lead to free rider questions
or rational apathy.").
280. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 277, at § 1.08:
Because of this combination of [the decision-making function and the risk-bearing function] in
close corporations, such corporations can avoid the sometimes costly agency problem of
protecting passive shareholders who need some method of monitoring the performance of the
corporation's managers and insuring that management's decisions are aligned with shareholder
interests.
281. For an explanation of"uni-peaked" preferences, see supra note 15.
282. See generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 15 at 38-62 (discussing Arrow's Theorem).
Indeed, Arrow's Theorem holds that in the presence of varying preferences among individual voters
(i.e., non-peaked or multi-peaked preferences), no method of combining preferences (e.g., voting)
can satisfy minimum standards of rationality. Id. at 38-39.
283. George W. Dent, Jr., The Role of Convertible Securities in Corporate Finance, 21 J. CORP.
L 241, 245 (1996) ("Most shareholders are risk-neutral toward each public company because they
diversify away risk by holding a broad portfolio of investments.").
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capital invested in firm-specific capital. Thus, these shareholders would
tend toward a higher degree of risk aversion.284 Other shareholders, such
as venture capitalists investing in the corporation, may have a more
diversified portfolio, and thus a better risk tolerance. These risk aversion
differences could easily lead to multi-peaked preferences.
Moreover, in a closely held corporation, many of the shareholders
may also hold positions within the company. This sets up a potential
conflict in preferences between the employee-shareholders, and the non-
employee-shareholders with respect to issues such as appropriate
compensation and dividend policy."' To further exacerbate the problem,
the exit option may be less easily realized because there is rarely a large,
liquid market for shares in closely held corporations.286 Finally, the same
familial and social bonds that serve to minimize the free-rider problem
could result in conflicts that disrupt the continuity of corporate control.
Faced with multi-peaked preferences, vote-buying may be a desirable
means of preference aggregation..2 " For example, assume that there are
three equal shareholders (A, B, and C) in a closely held corporation.
Further, assume that an issue comes to vote before the shareholders, for
instance, authorization to pursue acquisition of a competitor. A believes
284. Paul Fellows & S.Y. Wu, The Scope ofLegal Interventions in Corporate Affairs, 15 J. CORP.
L. 465, 472-75 (1990) (discussing entrepreneurial risk aversion and its impacts on financing
choices). In fact, "[i]t is generally understood that the transition from an owner-operated sole
proprietorship to a public corporation is predicated on either a wealth constraint or the risk aversion
of the entrepreneur." Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14 (1989).
285. That is not to suggest that publicly held companies do not also have employee-shareholders.
As a percentage of total ownership, however, the employee-shareholders typically consist of a
relatively small group. That is, while there may be multi-peaked preferences with regard to such
issues in the publicly held corporation, the relative magnitudes of the preferences in terms of share
ownership are quite different.
286. See Moll, supra note 103, at 789-90 (suggesting that absence of market for shares is primary
cause of potential shareholder oppression in close corporations). In addition, the shares may be
subject to restrictions on transfer, such as vesting or a corporate right of first refusal at a
predetermined price. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 202(c) (permitting designated categories of
transfer restrictions), 342(a)(2) (making the existence of a stock transfer restriction a prerequisite to
the election of statutory close corporation status) (1991 & Supp. 2000).
287. This Article is not the first to suggest the general possibilities of vote-buying as a preference
aggregation tool. In his recent article, for example, Saul Levmore discusses the use of vote-buying
for preference aggregation in civic elections. See generally Levmore, supra note 2, at 142-58. While
he also considers the possibility that similar arguments could support the application of vote-buying
to the corporate governance realm, he dismisses the need for preference aggregation there because
shareholders share "a single metric, value maximization." Id. at 158. As discussed in the text, while
this analysis is correct in the context of publicly held corporations, it fails to recognize the possibility
of divergent shareholder interests in closely held corporations.
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that such an action would result in an expected net return to the company
of $10,000, B believes it will result in a $5,000 loss, and C believes that
the competitor is priced such that the acquisition would neither result in
benefit nor harm (i.e. $0 value).
A would clearly vote for the acquisition, and B against it. The swing
vote (C) would have no real basis for deciding one way or the other.
However, if vote-buying were permitted, A and B could bid for C's vote.
Because A values the vote more highly, A would presumably buy C's
vote, and the acquisition would move forward.288 This results in the
option with the highest aggregate shareholder value being chosen.
One possible objection is that this results in C getting more than "his
share" of the value. Of course, from a pure efficiency standpoint, such
distributional concerns are moot.289 In any event, it is unlikely that C
would receive a large premium. Assuming A, B, and C all have equal
information about the others' preferences and the associated prices,29 B
would have very little incentive to engage in an auction for C's vote
because he knows that A would outbid him. Without a competing bidder,
C would not really have a credible threat to vote with B. Thus, A should
be able to "buy" the vote at a relatively low price. In fact, if C holds out
for too high a price, A could simply buy B's vote. Once B realizes that
he would lose a bidding contest (i.e., A's preference outweighs his), B
could easily switch from competing with A for purchase, to competing
with C as a seller. This incentive mechanism also serves to keep the price
relatively low.
Of course, as a practical matter, many closely held corporations use
voting trusts or voting agreements to avoid the control difficulties
envisioned here.291 Or, they may use multiple classes of stock
guaranteeing the competing shareholders control over set percentages of
the board, a favorite technique in venture capital deals. Vote-buying,
however, with its ability to provide relatively efficient preference
aggregation, might prove a useful technique in small corporations.
288. Note that A will be willing to pay up to $3,333 (one third of $10,000) for the vote, while B
would only be willing to pay half of that (to avoid his perceived loss of one third of $5,000).
289. So long as all efficient transactions go forward (i.e., shareholder preferences are maximized),
the allocative aspects of the vote-buying transaction do not impact the efficiency of the corporation.
290. Given that the example posits a closely held corporation with only three shareholders, this
assumption is plausible.
291. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 277, at § 5.02.
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CONCLUSION
The Internet promises to make shareholder voting a more frequently
used and more powerful tool for corporate management. A renewed
interest in corporate voting, however, also requires a closer look at the
voting process, and the appropriate limitations on methods used to
compete for votes in the corporate world. One such method is vote-
buying.
The current legal rule is that vote-buying is, as a general matter,
permissible. Although this change from the earlier common law
treatment of such transactions as per se illegal has been welcomed by
some, it is by no means clear that such transactions are beneficial. In a
public corporation, vote-buying presents possibilities for both looting
and coercive wealth transfers. While it also has potential as a means to
overcome anti-shareholder "shareholder rights plans," that potential
could be better achieved through use of turnout incentives. Thus, in
public corporations, there are reasons to believe that a return to per se
invalidity would be beneficial for shareholders.
In close corporations, vote-buying offers greater promise. Here the
principal difficulties are not the collective action problems faced by
atomized shareholders in publicly-held corporations. Rather, in a close
corporation, the shareholders are more likely to face preference
aggregation problems. Vote-buying is potentially a useful tool for
overcoming those aggregation problems by allowing the competing
shareholders to express the relative strengths of their preferences through
bidding for the votes of the more neutral shareholders. While this
aggregation can be accomplished through other means as well, vote-
buying may represent the most convenient, inexpensive, and efficient
tool for achieving it.
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